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Rethinking HIV-Exposure Crimes
MARGO KAPLAN

*

This Article challenges the current legislative and scholarly approaches to
HIV-exposure crimes and proposes an alternative framework to address their
flaws. Twenty-four states criminalize consensual sexual activities of people with
HIV. Current statutes and the scholarship that supports them focus on HIV-positive
status, sexual activity, and knowledge of HIV-positive status as proxies for risk,
mental state, and consent to risk. As a result, they are dramatically over- and
underinclusive and stigmatize individuals living with HIV. Criminalization should
be limited to circumstances in which a defendant exposed her partner to a
substantial degree of unassumed risk and did so with a culpable mental state as to
transmission. This approach requires a fact finder to consider all evidence relevant
to the risk of transmission and the victim’s understanding of that risk, a modest
requirement that would nonetheless invert outcomes in numerous prosecutions. The
Article contextualizes these arguments within the larger debate on the use of rules
and standards in the criminal law and explores the implications of its approach for
HIV-exposure criminalization as well as any offense drafted in response to an
emerging threat.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the onset of the AIDS epidemic, the very idea of HIV has shaken
Americans’ sense of security and fostered deep fear and distrust of people with
HIV. This is most striking in our use of criminal law—society’s harshest form of
condemnation—to punish HIV-positive individuals who engage in consensual
sexual conduct without disclosing their HIV-positive status to their partners. 1 In the
past two decades, approximately half of state legislatures have criminalized the
sexual activities of HIV-positive individuals. 2 Advocates of these statutes argue
that criminalization protects the partners of HIV-positive individuals by punishing
those who know their HIV-positive status but do not disclose it to potential
partners. 3 Critics counter that the statutes are too broad and undermine public

1. See Larry Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health,
and Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017, 1017–19 (1989) (describing calls for criminal
restrictions on sexual activities of HIV-positive individuals in the late 1980s); Leslie E. Wolf
& Richard Vezina, Crime and Punishment: Is There a Role for Criminal Law in HIV
Prevention Policy?, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 821, 822–25 (2004) (describing media reports of a
“new breed of sexual predator” who transmitted HIV to others and consequent support for
criminal laws that punish HIV exposure).
2. Twenty-four states have criminal offenses that target the consensual sexual activities
of HIV-positive individuals in particular. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-14-123 (2006); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 120290, 120291 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24(2)
(West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(C) (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608 (2011); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2 (West Supp. 2011); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-41-7-1 (2011),
35-42-1-9 (2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.1 (West 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5
(2007); MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 18-601.1 (LexisNexis 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.5210 (West 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-27-14(1) (West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 191.677 (West 2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.205 (LexisNexis 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:34-5 (West Supp. 2011); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41A.0202 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE
§12.1-20-17 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11 (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-18-31 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-108 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.4:1
(2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.011 (West 2009). This Article does not address
general public health laws that criminalize exposing others to communicable diseases
because most of these statutes were enacted prior to the discovery of HIV and are usually
minor offenses, and I could find no record of a case of HIV exposure being prosecuted under
such public health laws. See CTR. FOR HIV L. & POL’Y, ENDING AND DEFENDING AGAINST
HIV CRIMINALIZATION: STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS AND PROSECUTIONS 2 (2010). Offenses
where HIV-positive status may increase the severity of the offense and sentence, such as
prostitution or assault with bodily fluid, are also beyond the scope of this Article, although
its reasoning certainly has implications for these offenses. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 647(f) (West 2010) (increasing sentence for prostitution if individual previously tested
positive for HIV).
3. See Carol L. Galletly & Steven D. Pinkerton, Toward Rational Criminal HIV
Exposure Laws, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327, 328 (2004) (concluding that the intent of HIV
exposure laws is to protect partners of HIV-positive individuals from being exposed to the
virus and to prevent transmission); Isabel Grant, The Boundaries of the Criminal Law: The
Criminalization of the Non-Disclosure of HIV, 31 DALHOUSIE L.J. 123, 150–56 (2008)
(outlining arguments for criminalizing HIV exposure without disclosure of status).
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health efforts. 4 In response, the Obama White House recently urged states to
consider redrafting or eliminating HIV-exposure crimes. 5 This Article challenges
the current legislative and scholarly approaches to HIV-exposure crimes and
proposes an alternative framework to address their flaws.
While HIV-exposure laws vary, nearly every statute uses HIV-positive status
(positive serostatus), sexual activity, and knowledge of positive serostatus as
proxies for risk of transmission, mental state as to transmission, and consent to risk.
Specifically, most statutes contain (1) a mens rea requirement that the defendant
must know she is HIV positive; (2) an actus reus requirement that the defendant
must be HIV positive and engage in certain prohibited conduct, usually specified
sexual activities; and (3) a requirement that the defendant’s sexual partner must not
be aware that the defendant is HIV positive. In South Carolina, for example, an
individual is guilty of a felony if she “knows that [she] is infected with [HIV]” and
knowingly engages in vaginal, anal, or oral intercourse with another person without
first disclosing her positive serostatus. 6
These statutes import the reasoning of the scholarship surrounding the
criminalization of HIV exposure. The dominant scholarship on HIV criminalization
can be divided roughly into two branches. The first branch has focused on
determining what behavior merits criminalization, reflecting a retributivist principle
of punishing only morally blameworthy behavior. This branch has ceded or
assumed the need to use sexual activities and serostatus as a proxy for risk,
knowledge of serostatus as a proxy for mens rea as to transmission, and a partner’s
knowledge of the defendant’s serostatus as a proxy for consent to risk of
transmission. The resulting debate has largely focused on which sexual acts should
be prohibited, what constitutes knowledge of serostatus, and whether a partner’s
knowledge of the defendant’s serostatus should serve as a defense. This approach is
reflected in the articles by Kathleen Sullivan, Martha Field, and Larry Gostin that
forged the scholarly debate on HIV-exposure criminalization in the late 1980s.
These articles argued that, to the extent criminal law should be employed in the
context of HIV exposure or transmission, it should prohibit specific sexual
activities unless the defendant’s partner was aware of the defendant’s serostatus. 7
Throughout the years, scholarship addressing how to criminalize HIV exposure has
focused on revising the proxies to reflect advances in our understanding of HIV. 8

4. See Scott Burris & Edwin Cameron, The Case Against Criminalization of HIV
Transmission, 300 JAMA 578, 580 (2008); Wolf & Vezina, supra note 1, at 869–70; Edwin
Cameron, Justice, Constitutional Court of S. Afr., Public Lecture at the Canadian HIV/AIDS
Legal Network Symposium on HIV, Law and Human Rights: The Criminalization of HIV
Transmission and Exposure 13–15 (Jun. 12, 2009).
5. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL HIV/AIDS STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES 37 (2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/NHAS.pdf.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145.
7. Gostin, supra note 1, at 1053–55; Kathleen M. Sullivan & Martha A. Field, AIDS
and the Coercive Power of the State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 139, 183–86, 196 (1988).
8. See, e.g., Michael L. Closen, The Arkansas Criminal HIV Exposure Law: Statutory
Issues, Public Policy Concerns, and Constitutional Objections, 1993 ARK. L. NOTES 47
(discussing which acts to prohibit and whether the partner’s knowledge of the defendant’s
serostatus should be a defense); Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 3; Isabel Grant, Rethinking
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For example, Leslie Wolf and Richard Vezina’s more recent works have advocated
updating the offenses to exclude activities we now know carry an extremely low
risk of transmission. 9 Ian Ayres and Katharine Baker advocated a crime of
“reckless sexual conduct,” which would criminalize all first-time sexual activity
without a condom, with an affirmative defense of consent to unprotected sexual
intercourse. 10
The second branch of scholarship has focused on consequentialist arguments for
and against criminalization. The majority of this scholarship is critical of HIVexposure laws, arguing that they have little deterrent value, undermine public
health goals, and stigmatize individuals living with HIV. Scott Burris, Zita
Lazzarini, South African Constitutional Court Justice Edwin Cameron, Mary Fan,
and others have taken this approach. 11 Scholarship in this branch may overlap with
the first branch of scholarship, arguing both that criminal law should not be used
but also proposing the best possible law should legislatures insist on prosecuting
sexual exposure. For example, articles by Gostin, Sullivan, and Field combine
criticisms of criminalizing HIV exposure with the proposals for criminalization
discussed above. 12 The first branch of scholarship influences this second branch; by
defining what an ideal HIV-exposure statute should be, the first branch of
scholarship frames the debate of whether such statutes are worthwhile.
This Article breaks with the current scholarship by challenging the assumptions
of the first branch of scholarship and proposing an alternative approach. It argues
that proxies are ill-suited to target risk, culpable mental state, and consent to risk in
the context of HIV exposure. The proxy-based approach that dominates scholarship
and legislation may have seemed appropriate when HIV emerged. But
advancements in medical knowledge and technology, as well as developments in
the social rules that govern relationships, require a reconceptualization of HIV in
the law, and in criminal law in particular. Serostatus and prohibited activities are
poor proxies for risk of transmission because they fail to account for the numerous
factors that we now know can significantly and interdependently influence risk and

Risk: The Relevance of Condoms and Viral Load in HIV Nondisclosure Prosecutions, 54
MCGILL L.J. 389 (2009) (arguing that condom use should be a defense, but not viral load);
Christina M. Shriver, State Approaches to Criminalizing the Exposure of HIV: Problems in
Statutory Construction, Constitutionality and Implications, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 319 (2001)
(advocating criminalizing penile penetration and oral-genital intercourse unless partner knew
defendant’s serostatus); J. Kelly Strader, Criminalization as a Policy Response to a Public
Health Crisis, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 435, 446 (1994) (suggesting the need for statutes that
clearly define prohibited acts and provide defenses of condom use and consent); Wolf &
Vezina, supra note 1, at 879–80 (arguing no disclosure needed if condoms used).
9. Wolf & Vezina, supra note 1, at 879–81.
10. Ian Ayres & Katharine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 599 (2005).
11. See, e.g., Scott Burris, Leo Beletsky, Joseph Burleson, Patricia Case & Zita
Lazzarini, Do Criminal Laws Influence HIV Risk Behavior? An Empirical Trial, 39 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 467 (2007); Burris & Cameron, supra note 4; Mary D. Fan, Sex, Privacy, and Public
Health in a Casual Encounters Culture, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 578–580 (2011); Zita
Lazzarini, Sarah Bray & Scott Burris, Evaluating the Impact of Criminal Laws on HIV Risk
Behavior, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 239 (2002).
12. Gostin, supra note 1, at 1053–55; Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 183–86, 196.
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reduce it to negligible levels. 13 They also fail to account for cumulative risk over
the course of a sexual relationship. A defendant’s knowledge of her serostatus is a
poor proxy for mens rea because it includes within its sweep individuals who are
neither reckless nor negligent; for example, because of the way HIV is transmitted,
an individual who knows she is HIV positive may engage in sexual conduct while
reasonably—and correctly—believing she poses a trivial risk of transmission to her
partner. Current statutes also assume that an individual’s knowledge of the
defendant’s HIV-positive status is both necessary and sufficient to demonstrate her
consent to risk of transmission, when in reality it is neither.
This Article proposes a framework for HIV-exposure laws that employs
standards rather than rules in order to better address the harm of HIV exposure
while minimizing or eliminating the problems of current statutes. In particular, this
approach allows the law to adapt to changes in our understanding of HIV
transmission and improvements in HIV prognosis, prevention, and treatment. It
also allows the fact finder to consider context-specific social norms with regard to
sexual activities that influence the wrongfulness of a defendant’s actions.
Specifically, this Article proposes three changes: (1) the actus reus should be
defined in terms of substantial and unjustifiable risk, rather than serostatus and
sexual activity; (2) the mens rea should be defined in terms of mental state as to
transmission rather than mere knowledge of serostatus; and (3) a defendant should
not be liable for the degree of risk to which her partner consented.
The first of these proposed changes—drafting statutes in terms of risk creation
and limiting culpability to substantial and unjustifiable risk—requires juries to
consider multiple variables that influence the risk to which the defendant exposed
the victim, such as viral load and condom use. This approach could invert outcomes
in numerous prosecutions. Iowa resident Nick Rhoades, for example, was recently
prosecuted under an HIV-exposure statute for a sexual encounter in which he failed
to disclose his serostatus. 14 Rhoades was convicted of a felony and sentenced to
twenty-five years in prison, a sentence later reduced to probation and mandatory
registration as a sex offender. 15 Rhoades’s undetectable viral load at the time of the
sexual encounter is irrelevant under Iowa’s statute but is evidence that he posed a
negligible risk of transmission to his partner. 16 Criminalizing only substantial and
unjustifiable risk also mitigates the troubling messages inherent in current statutes,
which imply that sex with an HIV-positive person is per se harmful.
The second proposed change requires the prosecution to demonstrate the
defendant had a culpable mental state as to transmission. This requirement better
ensures that a defendant is punished in proportion to her blameworthy mental state.
Criminal punishment without a culpable mental state rarely serves the interests of
justice. 17 Defining mens rea in terms of the harm of transmission more

13. See infra Part I.B.
14. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.1 (West 2003); Mary Stegmeir, HIV Case Brings
25-Year Sentence, WCF COURIER, May 3, 2009.
15. See Arthur Breur, Nick Rhoades 25-Year Sentence Cut Short, But He’s Hardly a
Free Man, ACCESSLINE, Sept. 14, 2009; Lynda Waddington, Convict Questions
Effectiveness, Consistency of Iowa’s HIV Transmission Law, IOWA INDEP., Sept. 16, 2009.
16. Waddington, supra note 15.
17. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cmt. 1 (1985); DOUGLAS HUSAK,
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appropriately targets blameworthy mental states. It also allows the law to punish in
proportion to blameworthiness, distinguishing individuals who intend harm from
those who are merely negligent.
The third proposed change requires HIV-exposure offenses to incorporate a
more nuanced approach to consent that focuses on consent to degrees of risk.
Current HIV-exposure statutes address consent indirectly, allowing the defense
only where a partner is aware of the defendant’s serostatus. 18 This Article argues
that awareness of status is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish that an
individual consented to the risk to which she was exposed. It proposes that a
defendant be liable only if there is a difference between the degree of risk to which
her partner consented and the degree of risk to which her partner was actually
exposed. Furthermore, the unassumed risk must be substantial and unjustifiable.
This approach ensures that HIV-positive individuals are punished only for the
substantial and unjustifiable risk to which their partners did not consent. It also
gives courts flexibility to consider the nuances of sexual relationships and the
context-specific nature of consent therein.
The Article concludes by discussing the broader implications of its arguments.
Challenging the first branch of HIV-exposure scholarship transforms the second
branch of the HIV-criminalization debate. Conduct that falls within the proposed
HIV-exposure statute is likely to be quite rare. Narrowing the category of conduct
that the offense targets strengthens second-branch arguments that HIV-exposure
offenses have meager benefits in relation to their costs.
This Article also has implications for criminalizing offenses where our
understanding of the underlying harm is tentative. In such circumstances, a paradox
emerges; while bright-line rules that use proxies provide clarity amid uncertainty,
they are stagnant and thus more likely than standards to become anachronistic.
HIV-exposure laws demonstrate the need for ex ante solutions to such
anachronism, particularly where our understanding of the harm at issue is subject to
medical, technological, or other scientific advancement. HIV-exposure laws also
demonstrate that critical analysis of proxy use can transform the debate over
whether to criminalize an action at all. Abandoning proxy use in favor of a more
direct approach brings into sharp relief the underlying justifications for
criminalization and their merits.
Part I analyzes the misplaced focus of current HIV-exposure statutes on
serostatus and activities as proxies for risk, mental culpability, and consent. This
results in over- and underinclusive statutes that unnecessarily stigmatize HIVpositive individuals. Part II proposes an alternative framework that criminalizes
only unassumed, substantial, and unjustifiable risk, and only where the defendant
has a sufficiently blameworthy mens rea as to transmission. It then addresses
several counterarguments to the proposed framework. Part III discusses the broader
implications of the arguments made in Parts I and II for both HIV criminalization
and any offense subject to significant uncertainty and scientific advancement.

OVERCRMINALIZATION 174–75 (2008) (arguing that an individual should not be punished for
risk creation unless she has a culpable mental state with regard to the ultimate harm to be
prevented).
18. See Shriver, supra note 8, at 322 (discussing the disclosure requirement).
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I. THE MISPLACED FOCUS OF CURRENT HIV CRIMINALIZATION
A. HIV Exposure Statutes and Harm
In order to understand HIV-exposure statutes, it is necessary to understand the
harm that is their concern. HIV-criminalization advocates argue that the need to
protect individuals from harm justifies HIV-exposure statutes. 19 Indeed, the
physical injury of HIV infection is a harm sufficient to merit the concern of
criminal law. 20 HIV is a chronic and serious disease that can substantially diminish
an individual’s quality of life. 21 It destroys blood cells that are crucial to the body’s
immune response and inhibits its ability to fight infections. 22 This harm, while not
immediate, is directly caused by the introduction of the virus to the system. 23 The
late stage of HIV infection, AIDS, involves severe damage to an individual’s
immune system, which leaves an individual less able to fight infections and certain
cancers. 24 An individual who transmits the disease to another causes another
physical harm by indirectly impairing the other person’s immune system. 25

19. See Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 3, at 328; Grant, supra note 3, at 150–56.
20. Joel Feinberg’s influential work on harm to others as justification for criminal law
defines harm as a wrongful setback to interests. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 31 (1987);
see also Dennis J. Baker, The Harm Principle vs Kantian Criteria for Ensuring Fair,
Principled and Just Criminalisation, 33 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 66, 74 (2008); R.A. Duff,
Criminalizing Endangerment, 65 LA. L. REV. 941, 946 (2005); Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a
Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 971–72 (2003); Hamish Stewart, Harms, Wrongs, and
Set-Backs in Feinberg’s Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 47, 51
(2001). Setbacks to physical health and prolonging life are examples of harms. See
FEINBERG, supra, at 37; Baker, supra, at 75; Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 188.
21. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631–48 (1998) (holding that HIV is a
disability).
22. LAURA PINSKY & PAUL HARDING DOUGLAS, THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY HANDBOOK
ON HIV AND AIDS 5 (2009).
23. Id. (describing HIV infection and how it weakens the immune system, leaving an
individual more prone to infections); Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality,
Understanding
Your
Body:
The
Immune
System
and
HIV,
http://www.ahrq.gov/consumer/bodysys/edbody4.htm.
24. PINSKY & DOUGLAS, supra note 22, at 6–8. AIDS is a diagnostic category, the
definition of which has changed over time. Since 1993, AIDS has been defined as an HIV
infection and either a specific group of diseases or conditions that are indicative of severe
immunosuppression or, where a person is asymptomatic, a significant level of immune
suppression characterized by a CD4 cell count below a certain threshold. Id. at 6.
25. It is not clear if the harm of HIV transmission includes secondary effects such as
opportunistic infections that result from an impaired immune system or the side effects of the
medication that is necessary for individuals to treat the virus. Another unresolved question is
whether HIV’s potential to shorten an individual’s life should be considered part of the harm
of HIV or if an individual who eventually dies as a result of an opportunistic infection was
killed by the HIV infection. See Dennis J. Baker, The Moral Limits of Consent as a Defense
in the Criminal Law, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 93, 106–07, 112–13 (2009). Further removed
from the HIV infection is the harm of the side effects and costs of antiretroviral therapy
(ART) medications, which often must be taken daily and indefinitely. See PINSKY &
DOUGLAS, supra note 22, at 41.
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This immune system compromise is a serious and chronic condition that should
be distinguished from the “death sentence” it once was. 26 New antiretroviral drugs
have been remarkably successful in improving both the length and quality of life
for individuals living with HIV. 27 The average life expectancy after an HIV
diagnosis has improved significantly since the 1990s, and some studies indicate
that the life expectancy of those with access to treatment is approaching that of the
HIV-negative population. 28 While some experimental treatments have shown
promise in eliminating the disease, there is currently no cure for HIV. 29
Although HIV exposure without transmission does not impair an individual’s
health, criminal law often prohibits conduct that puts another at risk of injury. 30
The numerous penal statutes prohibiting inchoate offenses such as reckless
endangerment and reckless driving reflect the principle that risk of physical harm
merits criminal punishment. 31 This principle is also well supported by scholarship,
and in particular by scholarship advocating a “harm principle” approach to
criminalization. 32 HIV exposure puts an individual at risk of infection and thus at
risk for harm. 33 Where a statute requires disclosure, the lack of disclosure is not a
harm in itself but a circumstance that negates the wrongfulness of the defendant’s
conduct because the individual being exposed to risk is aware of the risk and has
consented to it. 34
In contrast, the perceived harm of simply having been intimate with an
HIV-positive individual is not the proper concern of criminal law. Sex with an
HIV-positive person is not in itself injurious. Punishing an HIV-positive individual
for her partner’s perception of being tainted uses the expressive power of the

26. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Restoring the ADA and Beyond: Disability in the 21st
Century, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 241, 319 (2008); Jane K. Stoever, Stories Absent from the
Courtroom: Responding to Domestic Violence in the Context of HIV and AIDS, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1157, 1165–66 (2009).
27. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF ANTIRETROVIRAL
AGENTS IN HIV-1-INFECTED ADULTS AND ADOLESCENTS 27–33 (2011). Newly infected
individuals not on treatment may be asymptomatic for years, and treatment decisions are
based primarily on viral load and immune system strength. Id.
28. Kathleen McDavid Harrison, Ruiguang Song & Xinjian Zhang, Life Expectancy
After HIV Diagnosis Based on National HIV Surveillance Data from 25 States, United
States, 53 J. AIDS 124, 127 (2010); Ard van Sighem, Luuk Gras, Peter Reiss, Kees
Brinkman & Frank de Wolf, Life Expectancy of Recently Diagnosed Asymptomatic
HIV-Infected Patients Approaches That of Uninfected Individuals, 24 AIDS 1527 (2010).
29. See Gero Hütter, Daniel Nowak, Maximilian Mossner, Susanne Ganepola, Arne
Müβig, Kristina Allers, Thomas Schneider, Jörg Hofmann, Claudia Kücherer, Olga Blau,
Igor W. Blau, Wolf K. Hofmann & Eckhard Thiel, Long-Term Control of HIV by CCR5
Delta32/Delta32 Stem-Cell Transplantation, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 692 (2009).
30. See HUSAK, supra note 17, at 159; Michael T. Cahill, Attempt, Reckless Homicide,
and the Design of Criminal Law, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 879, 890 (2007); Duff, supra note 20,
at 941–42, 953.
31. See Duff, supra note 20, at 950; Finkelstein, supra note 20, at 967.
32. See generally supra note 20.
33. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 158.
34. See FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 35–36; JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 176–80
(1986) (discussing effect of consent on wrongfulness).
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criminal law to promote the stigmatization of and discrimination against HIVpositive individuals. This is the very stigma and discrimination that statutes such as
the Americans with Disabilities Act (under which HIV has been recognized as a
disability) were enacted to eliminate, and criminal law should not promote the
social harm of unfounded prejudices. 35
It is likewise inappropriate to use criminal law to punish an HIV-positive
individual for the betrayal her partner may feel upon learning she did not disclose
her serostatus prior to their sexual activities. An individual might feel (and actually
have been) misled regarding her partner’s serostatus, or she may believe that her
consent was obtained under false pretenses. 36 With some exceptions, such wrongs
are generally not considered harms within the scope of criminal law. 37
A possible exception to this might be to address HIV exposure as a form of rape.
Misleading a sexual partner about information that might change the partner’s
decision to engage in sex may infringe on the partner’s sexual autonomy and
constitute rape by fraud. 38 Most jurisdictions criminalize rape by fraud in the
factum, in which the defendant misleads the victim about the nature of the activity
(e.g., that they are engaging in a gynecological exam as opposed to sex), but do not
criminalize fraud in the inducement, in which the defendant misleads the victim
about the circumstances of the sex (e.g., the defendant’s occupation or marital
status). 39 Failure to disclose serostatus constitutes fraud in the inducement, and
therefore would not fall within the definition of rape in the vast majority of
jurisdictions. 40
Addressing failure to disclose HIV-positive status as a form of rape would
therefore require reconceptualizing rape in most jurisdictions. This change may be
beneficial; indeed, many scholars have advocated some form of rape by fraud in the
inducement offense. 41 But if failure to disclose serostatus should be criminalized as
a form of rape by fraud, then it should be included in a broader rape by fraud
offense, rather than one that targets only misrepresentations made by HIV-positive
individuals. More importantly, this statute should be the product of a broader
discussion of what type of misrepresentations or omissions would constitute rape
by fraud. Such a discussion must also consider that using serostatus and lack of

35. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2011).
36. See ROBERT KLITZMAN & RONALD BAYER, MORTAL SECRETS: TRUTH AND LIES IN
THE AGE OF AIDS 49–50 (2003) (discussing individuals who felt betrayed upon finding out
their partners were HIV positive and had not disclosed earlier in the sexual relationship).
37. See FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 45–51.
38. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX 274–80 (1998); David P. Bryden,
Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 457–75 (2000); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE
L.J. 1087, 1120–21 (1986); Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64
BROOK. L. REV. 39, 157–71 (1998); Alan Wertheimer, What Is Consent? And Is It
Important?, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 557, 559–60 (2000).
39. See, e.g., Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125 (Cal. Ct. App.1985)
(noting that fraud in the factum negates consent, while fraud in the inducement does not); see
also Falk, supra note 38, at 157–59.
40. See Bryden, supra note 38, at 457–60; Falk, supra note 38, at 108–19.
41. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 38, at 152–59. See generally Estrich, supra note
38.
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disclosure as a proxy for lack of consent to sex may be problematic, for the same
reasons that (as this Article argues in Parts I.D and II.C) using serostatus and lack
of disclosure as a proxy for lack of consent to risk is problematic. A
context-specific analysis of whether the defendant’s failure to disclose her
serostatus constituted rape by fraud might be better suited to contend with the
context-specific nature of consent to sexual activity. For these reasons, and because
the risk-of-transmission justification for HIV-exposure statutes has been the focus
of the prevailing scholarly and legislative debate, this Article focuses on risk of
transmission as the harm at issue in HIV-exposure offenses. 42
Twenty-four states have sought to address this risk by creating specific criminal
statutes prohibiting certain consensual sexual conduct of HIV-positive individuals
that would otherwise be legal, even when it does not result in HIV transmission. 43
While these HIV-exposure laws 44 vary, nearly every statute contains (1) an actus
reus requirement that the defendant is HIV-positive and engage in certain
prohibited conduct, usually specified sexual activities; (2) a mens rea requirement
that the defendant know her serostatus; and (3) a requirement that the defendant’s
sexual partner must not be aware of the defendant’s serostatus. 45 The following
Sections argue that the nuances of HIV transmission render these—and any
proxies—ill suited to denote actual risk of transmission, mental culpability, and
consent to risk.
B. Positive Status and Sexual Activities as Actus Reus
Despite their differences, most HIV-exposure statutes share a common and
problematic trait of defining prohibited conduct in terms of whether (1) an
individual is HIV-positive and (2) the individual engaged in certain activities. 46
Michigan, for example, prohibits an HIV-positive individual from engaging in
“sexual penetration,” which it defines as “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio,
anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s
body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body.” 47

42. See Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 3, at 328; Grant, supra note 3, at 150–56.
43. See supra note 2. For detailed analyses of each statute, see CTR. FOR HIV L. &
POL’Y, supra note 2, at 7–200. See also Lazzarini et al., supra note 11, at 248.
44. Although I argue that many of these prosecutions involved no or negligible risk of
transmission, I use the term “exposure” to discuss prosecutions and statutes in which the
conduct of HIV-positive individuals is criminalized where there is no transmission.
45. This third requirement may be an element of the offense or an affirmative defense.
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5210 (West 2001) (failure to disclose is an element
of the offense); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-27-14(1) (West 2011) (prior knowledge and willing
consent to exposure is affirmative defense).
46. Fourteen states prohibit conduct solely on the grounds of status and specific sexual
activity: Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia. An additional five
statutes prohibit specific conduct but require the conduct pose some sort of risk: Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, South Dakota, and Tennessee. Three statutes prohibit an HIV-positive person
from “expos[ing]” another to HIV or “transfer[ing]” HIV to another: Maryland, Mississippi,
and Washington. For statutes, see supra note 2.
47. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5210.
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The focus on prohibiting HIV-positive individuals from engaging in specific
activities reflects the prevailing scholarship. Advocates and critics of these statutes
alike have generally agreed that criminal law principles support some form of
criminal punishment where an HIV-positive individual exposes another to risk of
transmission but vigorously debate precisely which sexual activities to
criminalize. 48 As discussed further in Part II.E.2, this approach has several benefits,
such as providing clear notice of the law’s requirements. 49 Accepting these
arguments, commentators have largely limited their debates to whether specific
activities are sufficiently risky to prohibit and whether these prohibitions would be
detrimental or beneficial to public health efforts. 50
Yet statutes defined in terms of status and activities are inherently problematic
because of the way HIV is transmitted. HIV is a fragile virus that will die outside
the body within minutes. 51 It requires an entrance into the body of another
individual in order to be transmitted. 52 This usually occurs through contact with the
mucosal membranes that line the vagina or rectum, although it can occur though
the urethra, broken skin, and on rare occasions the mouth. 53 When HIV enters the
body, transmission is still uncertain because “the virus must infect a sufficient
number of target cells to establish an infection.” 54
Because of these requirements, the risk of transmission in a particular sexual
activity varies significantly based on numerous factors that are specific to each
individual sexual act. 55 These factors include the type of sexual activity; whether
penetration is involved and, if so, the type of penetration; whether the individual is

48. See, e.g., Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 3, at 334 (proposing that legislatures
categorize activities according to risk and prohibit activities by category); Grant, supra note
8, at 403 (arguing that the criminal law should not prohibit sex with condoms, but should
prohibit sex regardless of viral load); Shriver, supra note 8, at 350–52; Strader, supra note 8,
at 446 (proposing a statute that defines certain acts as risky and provides a defense of
consent and condom use); Sullivan & Field, supra note 7 (advocating for an affirmative duty
to disclose serostatus and take precautions); Wolf & Vezina, supra note 1, at 879–80
(arguing that criminal statutes should not criminalize activities that comply with public
health prevention guidelines).
49. See infra Part II.E.2.
50. See, e.g., Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 3, at 334; Grant, supra note 8, at 403;
Shriver, supra note 8, at 350–52 (proposing a statute criminalizing sexual contact that has
been medically proven to be a viable means of transfer of HIV, unless partner was aware of
defendant’s serostatus); Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 179–94 (advocating for an
affirmative duty approach if HIV-exposure is criminalized, but citing concerns that such
criminalization’s disadvantages outweigh its costs).
51. HIV is much more fragile than the viruses that cause colds or the flu. It is killed by
heat, soap and water, household bleach solutions, alcohol, hydrogen peroxide, and the
chlorine used in swimming pools. Bleach kills HIV on contact; soap and alcohol require
exposure of a few minutes. PINSKY & DOUGLAS, supra note 22, at 13.
52. See id. at 11.
53. ERIC MYKHALOVSKIY, GLENN BETTERIDGE & DAVID MCLAY, HIV NON-DISCLOSURE
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: ESTABLISHING POLICY OPTIONS FOR ONTARIO 28 (2010); PINSKY &
DOUGLAS, supra note 22, at 11–12, 32.
54. MYKHALOVSKIY ET AL., supra note 53, at 26.
55. Id. at 28–35; PINSKY & DOUGLAS, supra note 22, at 36–37.
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the insertive or receptive partner; the type of fluid involved in the exposure;
whether the HIV-positive individual is on antiretroviral therapy (ART) and her
viral load; whether either individual has certain sexually transmitted infections
(STIs); and whether condoms or other latex barriers are used. 56
Transmission rates vary significantly between types of sexual activities
depending on the amount and type of the bodily fluids and tissues involved. The
lining of the rectum, vagina, and urethra are more susceptible to infection than the
mouth due to their cell composition. 57 The lining of the rectum is more susceptible
than the vagina because it tears more easily. 58 Insertive partners face a smaller risk
of transmission than receptive partners because the lining of the urethra comes in
contact with less fluid than the vagina or rectum. 59 The type of fluid involved is
relevant because blood and semen contain the highest amount of HIV, cervical
secretions contain less, vaginal secretions still less, and pre-ejaculatory fluid
contains an extremely low level of the virus. 60
Table 1 demonstrates how these factors dramatically alter transmission risks for
unprotected sexual activities.
Table 1: Per-Act Transmission Rates For A Single Act of Unprotected Sex 61
UNPROTECTED SEXUAL ACTIVITY
OF UNINFECTED PARTNER

TRANSMISSION RATE

Receptive Anal Sex

65 to 169 in 10,000 (.65% to 1.69%)

Insertive Anal Sex

6 in 10,000 (.06%)

Receptive Vaginal Sex

5 to 9 in 10,000 (.05% to .09%)

Insertive Vaginal Sex

1 to 3 in 10,000 (.01% to .03%)

Fellatio (making oral contact)

4 to 6 in 10,000 (.04% to .06%), some estimates much lower

Fellatio (receiving oral contact)

Theoretical

Cunnilingus (making oral contact)

No estimates—a few cases reported where blood present

Cunnilingus (receiving oral contact)

Theoretical

Anilingus (performing oral contact)

No estimates—only one documented case

Anilingus (receiving oral contact)

Theoretical

Manual Stimulation

No risk unless open sores, then theoretical risk

56. MYKHALOVSKIY ET AL., supra note 53, at 28–35; PINSKY & DOUGLAS, supra note 22,
at 36–37.
57. PINSKY & DOUGLAS, supra note 22, at 32.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Pre-ejaculatory fluid is also usually produced in smaller amounts than semen.
This, combined with its lower viral load, makes transmission via this fluid much less likely
than transmission via semen. Id.; Jeffrey Pudney, Monica Oneta, Kenneth Mayer, George
Seage III & Deborah Anderson, Pre-Ejaculatory Fluid as Potential Vector for Sexual
Transmission of HIV-1, 340 LANCET 1470 (1992).
61. See id. at 32–36.
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These transmission rates are far from fixed; even within a particular sexual
activity, numerous variables influence the likelihood of transmission. Perhaps most
notably, condoms can virtually eliminate the risk of infection by preventing
infected bodily fluids from coming into contact with a mucous membrane. 62 When
used consistently, condoms reduce the risk of HIV transmission by an estimated
90%, with greater potential effect for perfect use. 63 For example, if there is a
per-act risk of .08% for receptive vaginal intercourse and no additional HIV risk
factors, in a group of 10,000 women who had unprotected vaginal intercourse with
an HIV-positive man, statistics predict that eight women would become infected
with HIV; if all 10,000 used a condom, this number would decrease by 90% to one
woman. Water-based lubricants further reduce the risk by lowering the risk of
condom breakage. 64 Withdrawal before ejaculation can also decrease the risk of
transmission. 65 Male circumcision may reduce the circumcised male’s risk of
transmission by approximately 60% in the context of vaginal intercourse, but the
degree to which it reduces risk during anal intercourse is not yet established. 66
Because the virus must infect a sufficient number of cells to establish an
infection, individuals with low viral loads are much less likely to transmit the
disease. 67 ART reduces viral load, which reduces the risk of HIV transmission. 68
Although the exact magnitude of the risk reduction is uncertain, a 2009 study found
that ART reduced heterosexual transmission by 92%. 69 This reduces a per-act
transmission rate of eight in 10,000 for vaginal intercourse to one in 10,000. 70 The
Swiss Federal Commission for HIV/AIDS has concluded that HIV-positive
individuals who are taking effective ART, have an undetectable viral load for six
months, and are free from other STIs are not sexually infectious. 71
The stage of infection and the presence of STIs also influence transmission risk.
The risk of HIV transmission is higher during the first two to three months of
infection, referred to as “primary infection.” 72 The per-act risk of HIV transmission
during primary infection may increase by a factor ranging from eight to forty-three

62. See id. at 37; UNAIDS, MAKING CONDOMS WORK FOR HIV PREVENTION 15–16
(2004); Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 3, at 328.
63. UNAIDS, supra note 62, at 15–16; Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 3, at 328.
64. PINSKY & DOUGLAS, supra note 22, at 33; J. Anyanti, B. Ali, A. Ankomah, G.
Omoregie, A. Adedeji & B. Ofudje, Soc’y for Family Health, XV International AIDS
Conference: Reducing Condom Breakage by Using Condom Lubricants: Evidence from
Brothel-Based Sex Workers in Nigeria 96–97 (2004).
65. MYKHALOVSKIY ET AL., supra note 53, at 31.
66. Id. at 32; see also Marie-Claude Boily, Rebecca F. Baggaley, Lei Wang, Benoit
Masse, Richard G. White, Richard J. Hayes & Michel Alary, Heterosexual Risk of HIV-1
Infection Per Sexual Act: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Observational Studies, 9
LANCET 118 (2009).
67. See MYKHALOVSKIY ET AL., supra note 53, at 26–27, 32.
68. Id. at 32–33.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Edwin J. Bernard, Swiss Experts Say Individuals with Undetectable Viral Load and
No STI Cannot Transmit HIV During Sex, NAM (Jan. 30, 2008), http://www.aidsmap.com/
page/1429357/.
72. MYKHALOVSKIY ET AL., supra note 53, at 34.
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compared to the chronic phase of the infection. 73 Advanced HIV has also been
associated with a seven- to twenty-fold increase in risk of transmission. 74 The
presence of STIs in either partner may also increase the risk of transmission by a
factor of 1.5 to five. 75
Several statutes prohibit conduct that poses negligible risk of transmission.
Arkansas and Michigan, for example, criminalize “any . . . intrusion, however
slight, of any part of [an HIV-positive individual’s] body or of any object into the
genital or anal openings of another person's body.” 76 This includes the use of sex
toys and mutual masturbation, conduct that not only poses no risk of transmission,
but is often encouraged as a safe alternative to intercourse. 77 The statutes’ plain
terms could include a gynecological exam performed by an HIV-positive
physician. 78 Statutes also over-criminalize by failing to reflect factors that mitigate
the risk of sexual activities. Only two states explicitly allow the use of condoms to
act as a defense, 79 and one state explicitly prohibits the use of condoms as a
defense. 80 Although a low or undetectable viral load can significantly reduce risk of
transmission, only one state provides for a defense where a defendant’s physician
has advised her that she was noninfectious. 81
While it is tempting to conclude that such statutes simply need to eliminate
glaring outliers such as manual stimulation or provide a condom-use defense, these
solutions ignore the statutes’ deeper inadequacies. Sexual exposure statutes that
define the offense in terms of status and activity are almost inevitably overbroad.
The numerous variables that affect risk—often interdependently—make it difficult
(if not impossible) to prohibit categories of sexual activities without being
overinclusive. For example, an HIV-positive male with a low viral load
demonstrated by blood tests may pose little risk of transmission. 82 Yet, if he also

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 34–35. STIs may increase the viral load in bodily fluids such as semen and
may increase an individual’s susceptibility to infection. See id.
76. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(c)(1) (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5210(2)
(West 2001); Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 3, at 329; see also Shriver, supra note 8, at
324–25, 337–38.
77. See Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 3, at 329 (discussing use of sex toys and
manual stimulation as risk-free alternatives to intercourse with an HIV-positive person);
Shriver, supra note 8, at 325–26.
78. See Shriver, supra note 8, at 325–26 (Arkansas statute could prohibit rectal exams
by HIV-positive physicians).
79. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. § 609.2241
(West 2009). North Carolina and North Dakota allow the defendant to rely on condom use as
a defense, but only if the defendant disclosed her status to her partner. Rather than presenting
a new defense, this merely presents an additional hurdle for a defendant seeking to argue
consent. See 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41A.0202(1)(a) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-20-17(3) (1997); see also infra Parts I.D and II.C (discussing defense of consent to
risk or partner’s awareness of the defendant’s status).
80. See MO. REV. STAT. § 191.677 (West 2011).
81. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608(3)(b) (2011).
82. See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text (describing impact of viral load on
transmission risk).
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has other STIs, the amount of the virus in his semen may be greater than the viral
load in his blood. 83 At the same time, these factors are irrelevant if he engages in
only oral or manual contact with another’s genitals or if he is the receptive partner
in anal sex because those activities do not involve his semen coming into contact
with his partner’s mucus membranes. If he is the insertive partner, condom use or
withdrawal before ejaculation will also decrease his risk of transmission. 84
Defining prohibited conduct in terms of status and activity prevents individuals
from demonstrating that, despite falling within these categories, their conduct was
not sufficiently risky to merit criminalization. In 2008, Iowa resident Nick Rhoades
was convicted under a statute prohibiting HIV-positive individuals from engaging
in intentional exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another “in
manner that could result” in HIV transmission. 85 Rhoades had sex with a man he
met in an Internet chat room without disclosing his serostatus. 86 Iowa’s law does
not allow finders of fact to consider factors such as the sexual activity, condom use,
viral load, and STI presence, as long as a possibility exists of transmission—
indeed, Rhoades was convicted despite the fact that he had an undetectable viral
load at the time. 87
Statutes that define prohibited conduct in terms of status and activity are also
potentially both overinclusive and underinclusive because our understanding of
what creates risk will change as our understanding of transmission changes and as
we develop more effective ways of preventing transmission. Factors that affect the
risk of transmission are still being discovered, and the means by and extent to
which they do so are unresolved. 88 Recent research demonstrates that low or
undetectable viral load reduces transmission risk drastically, 89 but how it does this
is not yet completely understood, and the extent to which it does will likely
increase as ART becomes more effective. 90 New prevention methods, such as
substances that can be applied to the genitals to reduce the infectivity of HIV, are
currently being developed. 91 As our knowledge of these factors increases and new
prevention methods become available, they will change determinations of whether
a particular conduct poses a sufficient risk to merit criminalization.
Statutes that define prohibited conduct in terms of status and activity may also
be underinclusive because they eliminate the possibility of culpability for

83. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text (describing impact of STIs on
transmission risk).
84. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text (describing impact of condoms and
withdrawal on transmission risk).
85. See IOWA CODE § 709C.1 (West 2003); see Breur, supra note 15; Stegmeir, supra
note 14; Waddington, supra note 15.
86. See Stegmeir, supra note 14.
87. See IOWA CODE § 709C.1; Waddington, supra note 15.
88. See MYKHALOVSKIY ET AL., supra note 53, at 32–33 (reviewing studies and
limitations).
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., FINAL REPORT: MICROBICIDE STAKEHOLDERS MEETING
(2010),
available
at
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_health/aids/TechAreas/
research/final_report_microbicide_meeting112910.pdf.
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cumulative risk. The statistics in Table 1 demonstrate that the probability of
transmission in a single sex act may be exceedingly low. 92 Yet this risk can
increase across multiple sex acts. 93 The vast majority of transmission cases have
required repeated exposure to the virus through multiple acts of intercourse. 94
Where statutes require that the specified prohibited activities pose some degree
of transmission risk, they usually set the bar for risk so low that an HIV-positive
individual engaged in prohibited activities cannot escape liability. 95 Illinois and
Iowa, for example, prohibit an HIV-positive individual from engaging in conduct
with another involving exposure to bodily fluids that could result in transmission,
potentially allowing prosecution where the defendant engages in conduct that poses
only a theoretical risk of transmission. 96 Similarly, Indiana prohibits sexual activity
that has been epidemiologically demonstrated to transmit HIV, no matter how
improbable. 97 This could prohibit low-risk activities with some chance of infection;
indeed, the Indiana Court of Appeals has interpreted it to include oral sex. 98
C. Knowledge of Status as Mens Rea
Statutes that criminalize the otherwise legal sexual activity of HIV-positive
individuals unduly focus their mens rea requirements on serostatus. Rather than
requiring a prosecutor to demonstrate that the defendant intended to infect her
partner or recklessly ignored a risk of transmission, most statutes require a
prosecutor to demonstrate only a defendant’s awareness of her serostatus. 99 This
includes within its sweep those without a blameworthy mental state as to
transmission while excluding some individuals who are reckless or intend to
transmit. It also results in disproportionate punishment by failing to distinguish
individuals who intend harm from those who are merely reckless or negligent.
Over half of HIV-exposure statutes require no mens rea other than a defendant’s
knowledge of her status and intent to engage in the prohibited activity. 100 Because
few individuals unintentionally engage in sexual activity, the crux of the mens rea
requirement is the defendant’s knowledge of her positive status. These statutes
seemingly presume a mens rea of recklessness or at least negligence from an

92. See supra Table 1.
93. See Timothy B. Hallett, Colette Smit, Geoff P. Garnett & Frank de Wolf, Estimating
the Risk of HIV Transmission from Homosexual Men Receiving Treatment to Their
HIV-Uninfected Partners, 87 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS 17 (2011).
94. See PINSKY & DOUGLAS, supra note 22, at 36.
95. Only two states, South Dakota and Tennessee, require the prosecution to
demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct presents a significant risk of transmission. See S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-31 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-108 (2010).
96. For example, the risk of transmission for an individual receiving cunnilingus is only
theoretical. See supra Table 1 and accompanying notes.
97. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-7-1 (LexisNexis 2011).
98. See Johnson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
99. Fifteen states have such a statute: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Virginia. See supra note 2.
100. See supra note 2.
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individual’s awareness of her status and intent to engage in the activity; that is, the
statutes seem to presume that one who knows her serostatus is aware of and
ignores—or at the very least should have been aware of—a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the prohibited sexual activity will result in transmission. 101
Knowledge of one’s serostatus, however, is a poor proxy for a culpable mental
state. As discussed in Part I.B, an individual who is HIV positive does not
necessarily—and indeed often will not—pose a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
transmission to an individual through sexual conduct. For example, an individual
with a low viral load engaging in oral sex may reasonably and correctly believe she
poses a negligible risk to her partner. 102 This individual is neither reckless nor
negligent. Statutes that focus solely on her awareness of her serostatus will
therefore include within their scope individuals who lack culpable mental states.
Using knowledge of serostatus as mens rea is also potentially underinclusive.
An individual who is not certain of her serostatus may still strongly suspect she is
infected and intend to transmit HIV to others, or may still recklessly risk
transmission to others. As argued below in Part II.B, such scenarios are likely to be
quite rare; however, they demonstrate that the flaws of using serostatus knowledge
as mens rea may cut both ways by excluding conduct that should be included. 103
Serostatus-focused mentes reae combine with overinclusive actus rei to allow
individuals to be held strictly liable for engaging in harmless acts that pose
insignificant risks. For example, an individual who knows her serostatus and
engages in anal intercourse, but has a low viral load and uses a condom, may
reasonably and correctly believe that she poses a negligible risk to her partner. 104
Yet she will be convicted under several statutes regardless of the risk she posed or
her culpability as to that risk. 105
In addition to punishing nonculpable conduct, these statutes impose
disproportionate punishment because they fail to distinguish between different
mental states. An individual who negligently fails to perceive the substantial and
unjustifiable risk she will infect her partner is less blameworthy than an individual
who is aware of that risk but recklessly ignores it. 106 Each of these individuals is

101. See James B. McArthur, Note, As the Tide Turns: The Changing HIV/AIDS
Epidemic and the Criminalization of HIV Exposure, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 717–18
(2009).
102. See supra Part I.B.
103. See infra Part II.B.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 62–65 (discussing impact of condom use and
viral load on transmission risk).
105. See supra note 44.
106. See Alan C. Michaels, Note, Defining Unintended Murder, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 786,
804 (1985) (arguing that unintended murder should be defined by the defendant’s state of
mind); Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L. REV. 319, 325–26
(1996) (arguing that culpability depends upon the actor’s mental state at the time of the
wrongful act and that the actor’s choice was freely made) [hereinafter Moore, Prima Facie];
Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 237, 237–38 (1994) (arguing that to determine what punishment someone
deserves depends upon how much wrong they did, and with what culpability they did that
wrong).
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less blameworthy than an individual who intends to transmit HIV to her partner. 107
Focusing on awareness of status ignores these critical distinctions.
D. Awareness of Status as a Proxy for Consent
Nearly every HIV-exposure statute reflects the principle that partners should be
able to consent to risk of harm in intimate relationships. 108 Allowing a defense of
consent respects the privacy of sexual relationships and the autonomy of the
individuals engaging in them. 109 It also prevents the criminal law from consigning
HIV-positive individuals to a life of celibacy. 110 With a defense of consent,
HIV-positive individuals are free to undertake any sexual activity as long as
partners are aware of the risks involved. 111
Yet current statutes apply this principle incorrectly because they focus on a
partner’s awareness of the defendant’s serostatus rather than the partner’s
awareness of actual risk. 112 Knowledge of a partner’s serostatus is neither necessary
nor sufficient for consent to risk of transmission. 113 An individual may be aware of
her partner’s status but believe the risk to be lower than it is—for example, where
an individual knows her partner is HIV-positive but mistakenly believes her partner
is on ART and is noninfectious. An individual may also be unsure of her partner’s
status and still be aware of the risk of transmission she is incurring, or even believe
the risk to be higher than it actually is. For example, she may consent to
unprotected sex with a person of unknown status, only to engage in sex with a
condom with an HIV-positive individual who is taking ART, has an undetectable
viral load, and is STI-free—a risk that may well be lower than unprotected sex with
an individual of unknown status.
Over half of these statutes also require an HIV-positive individual to disclose
her status in order for her partner to have consented to the risk. 114 While disclosure
is evidence of awareness of risk, the two are not coextensive. Disclosure can occur
without awareness—for example, if an individual tells his partner he is
HIV-positive, but his partner erroneously believes they are using a condom.
Awareness can also occur without disclosure—an individual may know her

107. See Moore, Prima Facie, supra note 106, at 325–26.
108. With the exception of Maryland’s statute, all offenses listed supra note 2 provide a
defense where a defendant’s partner knew the defendant was HIV-positive. See also Galletly
& Pinkerton, supra note 3, at 333 (disclosure of serostatus implies consent).
109. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 176–77 (banning all sexual conduct of
HIV-positive individuals would be unfair to couples who want to continue sexual
relationships in spite of risks).
110. See id. at 175–77; Gostin, supra note 1, at 1053–54.
111. See Shriver, supra note 8, at 352 (arguing for mandatory disclosure); Sullivan &
Field, supra note 7, at 177–78 (criminal law could avoid requiring total abstinence as long as
individual disclosed status or took precautions to avoid transmission).
112. See supra note 103.
113. See MATTHEW WEAIT, INTIMACY AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE CRIMINALISATION OF
HIV TRANSMISSION 175–76 (2007).
114. Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, and
Washington require disclosure. For statutes, see supra note 2.
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partner’s serostatus and thus some aspects of the risk of sexual conduct without her
partner having disclosed it to her, or may be unsure of a partner’s serostatus but be
aware of the risk of transmission. 115
E. Troubling Messages and Consequences
This Section demonstrates an additional troubling dimension 116 to statutes’
focus on serostatus and activities: they reinforce negative and unsupported
stereotypes about individuals living with HIV. By focusing on serostatus and
activities as opposed to risk, current statutes send the message that sex with an
individual living with HIV is a harm per se, regardless of transmission risk, and
that this harm merits the condemnation of criminal law. This message is reflected
in and reinforced by harsh and disproportionate sentences for those convicted under
HIV-exposure statutes.
Targeting sexual conduct rather than risk of transmission implies that sexual
contact with a person living with HIV is in itself harmful, regardless of the risk of
transmission. HIV has historically been, and remains, a stigmatized disease. 117 This
is in large part because it is sexually transmitted and because it disproportionately
affects marginalized groups such as gay men, drug users, sex workers, the poor,
and communities of color. 118 Consequently, individuals receiving positive test
results often report feeling “worthless” and “dirty.” 119 Sex with an individual living
with HIV, even without risk of transmission, brings with it the stigma of being less

115. See WEAIT, supra note 113, at 178.
116. It is difficult to determine the scope of the problem of overinclusive prosecutions for
many reasons. First, data on HIV-exposure prosecutions is extremely difficult to compile.
This is in part because official data on prosecutions for HIV exposure are not compiled. See
Lazzarini et al., supra note 11, at 244. Researchers must rely on reported decisions and news
coverage. See, e.g., id. For example, in 2002, Zita Lazzarini, Scott Burris, and Sarah Bray
compiled data on prosecutions between 1986 and 2001 using reported decisions and news
articles. See id. at 244–45 & tbl.2. They identified eighty-four prosecutions based on
consensual sex, with a conviction rate of 76.2%. See id. This likely under-represents the
prosecutions, as most prosecutions in general do not result in reported decisions or press
coverage. The second reason the scope of the problem is difficult to determine is that, even
where case law or news coverage is available, data relevant to the magnitude of the risk or
the mens rea as to transmission is excluded because this data is often irrelevant under the
statute. Thus, the statutes’ reliance on overinclusive proxies helps obscure the scope of the
problem of their overinclusivity.
117. See WEAIT, supra note 113, at 129–47; Cameron, supra note 4, at 15–16; Grant,
supra note 3, at 160–64. See generally Gregory M. Herek & John P. Capitanio, AIDS Stigma
and Sexual Prejudice, 42 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1130 (1999).
118. See WEAIT, supra note 113, at 136–47; Cameron, supra note 4, at 13; Grant, supra
note 3, at 160–62; Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 142. The stigma of a disease that is
transmitted through sexual activity—particularly sexual activity deemed deviant—was
illustrated in the film District 9, in which a villainous corporation ostracizes the protagonist
from his community by reporting that he has a communicable disease he contracted through
sex with alien creatures. DISTRICT 9 (TriStar Productions 2009).
119. See KLITZMAN & BAYER, supra note 36, at 18–25; WEAIT, supra note 113, at 133–
47.
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clean and pure. 120 Criminalizing sexual activity regardless of the actual risk it poses
uses criminal law’s expressive purpose of condemnation to endorse this stigma. 121
It reinforces the perception that sex with an HIV-positive person is a per se harm
that merits the censure and punishment of criminal law.
Current statutes reinforce this message by providing a defense where a partner is
aware of the defendant’s status rather than a defense of consent to risk. Requiring a
defendant’s partner to be aware of the defendant’s positive status implies that the
harm that must be consented to is not risk of transmission, but rather sex with an
HIV-positive person. This message is reflected in news reports about prosecutions
that focus on defendants’ failure to disclose their status to a partner rather than risk
of transmission as the culpable conduct. 122 In the Rhoades case, Rhoades’s partner
read a statement to the court in which he characterized the harm done to him by
arguing, “I should have had the right to choose whether to be intimate with
someone who was HIV positive . . . . Instead, Nick was manipulative and denied
me that right.” 123
This message is also reinforced by the disproportionate punishment accorded to
HIV-exposure statutes in comparison to other endangerment offenses. Subjecting
HIV exposure to harsher penalties than similar risk creation implies that HIV
exposure creates a harm in addition to the risk of transmission. Nearly every state
with an HIV-exposure statute classifies the offense as a felony. 124 The average
maximum prison sentence is over eleven years, and eight states allow sentences of
or in excess of fifteen years. 125 In contrast, most reckless endangerment offenses,

120. See WEAIT, supra note 113, at 133–47. The Fair Housing Act recognizes that the
stigma of HIV extends to individuals associated with those living with HIV. It protects an
individual who is merely associated or believed to be associated with someone living with
HIV from discrimination, even if no one believes the individual is HIV-positive. See 42
U.S.C. § 3604(f) (2006).
121. See Grant, supra note 8, at 400 (discussing symbolic purpose of criminal law in the
context of HIV exposure, and advocating that law send messages consistent with public
health policy); Wolf & Vezina, supra note 1, at 859 (arguing that statutes’ failure to account
for safer sex practices suggests underlying message that HIV-positive individuals should be
abstinent).
122. See, e.g., Keith Epps, Keeping HIV Secret Lands Man in Jail: Failure To Inform
Girlfriend About Virus Brings 9-Month Sentence in Stafford, FREE LANCE-STAR, Mar. 27,
2008; Tom Giambroni, Husband Allegedly Kept HIV a Secret, MORNING J., Oct. 2, 2010.
123. See Stegmeir, supra note 14.
124. Where states do not classify offenses using the terms “felony” and “misdemeanor,” I
used the general rule in which an offense with a potential period of incarceration exceeding
one year is considered a felony. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(a) advisory committee’s note.
Of the statutes set forth supra note 2, only Maryland and North Carolina classify the offense
as a misdemeanor rather than a felony. Even so, conviction under the Maryland and North
Carolina statutes can result in up to three years imprisonment and up to two years
imprisonment, respectively. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN § 18-601.1(b) (LexisNexis
2009); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41A.0202 (2011).
125. States that have sentence ranges of or in excess of fifteen years are Arkansas (six to
thirty years); Idaho (up to fifteen years); Iowa (up to twenty-five years); North Dakota (up to
twenty years); Missouri (five to fifteen years); South Dakota (up to fifteen years); Tennessee
(up to fifteen years); and Washington (ninety-three to 318 months). ARK. CODE ANN.
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which prohibit recklessly engaging in conduct that creates a substantial risk of
serious injury or death to another, are classified as misdemeanors with sentences of
up to six months or one year. 126
Below, Table 2 compares the offense level and sentences for states with both
endangerment and HIV-exposure offenses. With the exception of Virginia,
HIV-exposure offenses are subject to harsher penalties than other risk-creation
statutes, sometimes to a startling degree. In North Dakota, for example, HIV
exposure is a felony with a potential prison sentence twenty times that of reckless
endangerment, which is only a misdemeanor; even a reckless endangerment that
demonstrates an extreme indifference to human life is a lesser offense with a
maximum penalty of five years, as compared with a potential twenty-year sentence
for HIV exposure. 127 In Illinois, HIV exposure that does not result in transmission
is subject to a higher penalty than reckless endangerment that results in grave
harm. 128
Table 2: Comparison of Endangerment Offenses and HIV-Exposure Offenses 129
STATE

FL

GA

ENDANGERMENT
OFFENSE
CLASSIFICATION
Second Degree
Misdemeanor: No
resulting harm

ENDANGERMENT
OFFENSE
SENTENCE
None

First Degree
Misdemeanor: Harm
results

Up to one year

Third Degree Felony:
Harm to minor due to
negligently kept firearm
Misdemeanor

Up to five years

Up to one year
and/or fine of up to
$1000.

HIV-EXPOSURE
OFFENSE
CLASSIFICATION
Third Degree Felony:
First violation

HIV-EXPOSURE
OFFENSE
SENTENCE
Up to five years

First Degree Felony:
Multiple violations

Up to thirty years

Felony

Up to ten years

§ 5-4-401; IOWA CODE § 902.9; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01; MO. REV. STAT. § 558.011;
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1; TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-35-111.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 9.94A510, 9.94A.515, 9.94A.550. For HIV statutes generally, see supra note 2.
126. See infra note 129; see also Cahill, supra note 30, at 933.
127. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17 (1997), with N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-03
(1997).
128. Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2 (West Supp. 2011), with 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-5 (West 2002).
129. See FL. STAT. ANN. §§ 384.34(5), 775.082, 784.05 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-5-60(b), 17-10-3(a)(1) (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-35, 5/5-4.5-40, 5/5-4.5-45,
5/5-4.5-50, 5/5-4.5-55, 5/12-5 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-1-9, 35-42-2-2(b),
35-50-2-6, 35-50-2-7, 35-50-3-3 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-17-03, 12.1-32-01 (1997);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-103, 39-13-109, 40-35-111 (2010). For HIV-exposure statutes,
see supra note 2.
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Class A Misdemeanor

Up to one year

Class Four Felony:
Grave harm results

One to three years

Class B Misdemeanor

Up to 180 days
and/or $1000 fine

Class D Felony: Deadly
weapon or aggressive
driving that results in
harm

Six months to three
years

ND

Class C felony:
Discharging firearm
into an inhabited
dwelling or place where
people likely to gather,
or aggressive driving
and results in death
Class A Misdemeanor

Up to five years
and/or fine of up to
$5000

TN

Class C Felony:
Demonstrated an
extreme indifference to
life
Class A Misdemeanor

Class E Felony:
Involves deadly weapon

Up to six years, no
less than one and/or
fine up to $3,000
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Class Two Felony

Three to seven
years and/or a
fine of up to
$25,000.

Class B
Misdemeanor:
Recklessly fails to
comply with statute

Up to 180 days
and/or $1000 fine

Class D felony:
Knowingly or
intentionally fails to
comply with statute

Six months to
three years and/or
$10,000 fine

Class A Felony

Up to twenty
years and/or fine
of up to $10,000

Class C Felony

Three to fifteen
years and/or fine
of up to $10,000

Two to eight years
and/or fine of
$10,000

Up to one year
and/or fine of up to
$2000

Up to 11 months,
29 days and/or fine
of up to $2000

While prosecutors have compared violations of HIV-exposure statutes to
“playing Russian Roulette” with the life of another, 130 an individual who actually
plays Russian Roulette with another may be subject to more modest penalties. 131
Yet firing a revolver with one round in it poses a one in six chance of serious
physical harm or death, and many of the prohibited activities in HIV-exposure
statutes pose a risk of transmission far less than one in 1000.

130. See, e.g., Cassidy Friedman, Sallee Sentenced for Trying to Spread HIV, THE
TIMES-NEWS (Twin Falls), Jan. 5, 2007; Deb Gruver, Sergeant Found Guilty in HIV-Sex
Case, WICHITA EAGLE, Jan. 20, 2011; Katie Thomas, Equestrian Is Facing H.I.V.-Related
Felony Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2010, at A12.
131. In Florida, reckless endangerment is only a misdemeanor with no prison sentence,
even if it results in harm. In North Dakota, reckless endangerment manifesting an extreme
indifference to human life is a Class C felony with a sentence of up to five years
imprisonment, while HIV exposure is a Class A felony with a sentence of up to twenty years
imprisonment. In Tennessee, reckless endangerment involving a deadly weapon is a Class E
felony, compared to the Class C felony of HIV exposure. For statutes, see supra notes 2 and
129.
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Punishing HIV exposure more severely than we punish comparable risks
distinguishes it as an exceptional harm, and increases the stigma associated with an
already stigmatizing disease. It implies that the harm of exposure is particularly
abhorrent, beyond other serious physical harms. This may reflect the underlying
belief that the conduct itself is harmful beyond the risk of transmission because
sexual conduct with a person living with HIV makes one unclean, while exposing
one to the stigma and discrimination of being associated with a person living with
HIV. Likewise, one who consents to sex with an HIV-positive individual is no
longer protected by criminal law, even if the risk of transmission was greater than
what she believed it to be.
In sum, current HIV-exposure statutes are overinclusive, result in
disproportionate punishment, and send troubling messages about HIV transmission
and individuals living with HIV. Part II proposes an alternative framework that
shifts the focus from proxies of serostatus and sexual activity to risk of
transmission, culpability as to transmission, and degrees of consent. This
framework would mitigate many of these problems, provide a fairer and more
accurate means of targeting truly wrongful behavior, and provide finders of fact
with more freedom and better guidance to consider the nuances and ambiguities of
intimate sexual relationships.
II. TARGETING UNASSUMED RISK
A. Risk-Based Statutes for a Risk-Based Offense
Not every risk of harm merits criminalization. Several everyday actions cause
harm to another, and almost every action risks harming another. 132 My boarding a
subway car while suffering a head cold puts other passengers at risk of becoming
ill. Even the most careful and skilled driving puts pedestrians at risk of serious
injury or death. Yet such conduct is not criminalized because the risk at issue is not
of sufficient magnitude or, if it is, its magnitude is outweighed by the interests in
allowing the conduct that creates it. 133 Determining whether a risk is substantial
and unjustifiable such that it merits criminalization requires weighing the gravity of
the potential harm, its probability, and the interests at stake in allowing the conduct
that creates the risk. 134
It is a widely accepted principle that risk of harm must reach a threshold
magnitude to merit criminalization; the degree of gravity and probability must
make the risk substantial. 135 The greater the gravity of the risk, the lower the

132. See FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 190; Paul H. Robinson, Prohibited Risks and
Culpable Disregard or Inattentiveness: Challenge and Confusion in the Formulation of
Risk-Creation Offenses, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 367, 372 (2003).
133. See Douglas N. Husak, Reasonable Risk Creation and Overinclusive Legislation, 1
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 599, 606 (1998) (“The prevention of minor and insignificant risks does
not merit the heavy hand of the criminal sanction.”); Robinson, supra note 132, at 372.
134. See FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 187–93; Robinson, supra note 132, at 372.
135. See HUSAK, supra note 17, at 161–62 (arguing that risk should not be criminalized
unless it is substantial); Robinson, supra note 132, at 372; see also FEINBERG, supra note 20,
at 188–90; Duff, supra note 20, at 952–54; Husak, supra note 133, at 606. The Model Penal
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probability may be for the risk to warrant criminalization; we require a smaller
probability to justify criminalizing a risk of death than we would to justify
criminalizing a risk of minor injury. 136 But criminalizing conduct that risks death
may still be unwarranted if the probability of death is negligible. 137
Similarly, conduct that risks HIV transmission should not be criminalized unless
the probability of transmission reaches a certain threshold that makes the risk
substantial. While the harm of HIV infection is significant, it does not follow that
any probability of transmission merits criminalization. Otherwise, the state should
prohibit any individual from engaging in sexual activity unless she first confirms
that she is not HIV-positive. 138 Where an individual is HIV-positive, some sexual
activities (such as manual stimulation) categorically involve such minimal risk that
they do not merit criminalization. 139 The remaining activities require an
individualized inquiry that includes all relevant risk factors.
Prohibiting only conduct that creates a substantial risk of transmission resolves
much of the overinclusive nature of current statutes. Statutes that prohibit conduct
based on status and activity necessarily include insubstantial risk because the
numerous variables that influence HIV transmission make it difficult, if not
impossible, to distinguish activities that categorically involve substantial risk. 140
Even those statutes that specify a certain level of risk almost uniformly set this

Code implicitly reflects this judgment—an individual cannot be reckless or negligent unless
he disregards a substantial risk, and the Code provides a defense for de minimus harm or
risk. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.03, 2.12(2) (1962).
136. See FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 187–93; Robinson, supra note 132, at 372.
137. See FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 187–93; Robinson, supra note 132, at 372. There is
also an argument that conduct should be prohibited where a defendant perceives a substantial
and unjustifiable risk and engaged in conduct regardless, even where the defendant was
wrong and no risk existed. See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN WITH
STEPHEN J. MORSE, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 171–97 (2009);
Cahill, supra note 30, at 890–922 (arguing that there is no good reason to reject an offense of
attempted reckless homicide); Finkelstein, supra note 20, at 963–64. One way to accomplish
this is by criminalizing attempted risk creation, even when, unbeknownst to the defendant,
the attempt cannot succeed. See Cahill, supra note 30, at 889 (discussing attempted risk
creation); Kenneth W. Simons, Mistake and Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpability: A
Speculative Essay, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 447, 484 n.119 (1990) (same). In order to
limit this Article to manageable size, attempts that are thwarted by impossibility are beyond
the scope of this Article.
138. This would be complicated by the fact that there is a “window period” in which
individuals who have recently been infected do not test positive for the virus. See Joanne D.
Stekler, Paul D. Swenson, Robert W. Coombs, Joan Dragavon, Katherine K. Thomas,
Catherine A. Brennan, Sushil G. Devare, Robert W. Wood & Matthew R. Golden, HIV
Testing in a High-Incidence Population: Is Antibody Testing Alone Good Enough?, 49
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 444, 444 (2009). The duration of this window period can last
weeks to months, depending on the test used. To have a negative test result and ensure its
accuracy to the best of her ability before engaging in sexual activity, an individual would
have to have been abstinent for the duration of the window period after her last sexual
encounter. See also W. Thomas Minahan, Disclosure Before Exposure: A Review of Ohio’s
HIV Criminalization Statutes, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 83, 90 (2009).
139. See supra Part I.B.
140. See supra Part I.B.
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threshold far below substantial risk. 141 Limiting criminal liability to substantial risk
requires finders of fact to consider the numerous interdependent factors that
influence the degree of risk inherent in the defendant’s conduct. The probability
that sexual activity will transmit HIV varies widely depending on factors such as
the type of sexual activity, whether there is emission of semen, whether the
defendant is the insertive or receptive partner, the use of a condom, the viral load of
the HIV-positive individual, and the presence of other STIs. 142
Even if a risk is substantial, criminalization is not warranted unless the risk is
also unjustifiable. Every voluntary activity has some value for an individual who
engages in it that must be weighed against the magnitude of the risk. 143 Even
careful driving in hazardous conditions at night may create a substantial risk of
death to other individuals, but the state does not criminalize this activity because of
the interests in such driving. Rather than categorically prohibit driving in certain
weather conditions, states prohibit reckless driving—that is, driving that creates a
substantial and unjustifiable risk. 144 HIV-exposure statutes should require a similar
calculus, allowing defendants to present evidence that even substantial risks were
justified.
While advocates of HIV-exposure statutes may argue that a serious impairment
to health is a much greater harm than simply forgoing sexual activity, this
comparison fails to capture the breadth and depth of the interests at issue. The type
of interests and their value varies considerably depending on several factors unique
to each individual circumstance. These interests may include physical gratification,
companionship, economic stability, and procreation. 145 Even those who argue that
the law should prohibit an HIV-positive individual from engaging in consensual
sexual activity where the uninfected partner is aware of her status and consents to
the risk have acknowledged that a potential exception should be made in cases
where partners seek to procreate. 146 The value placed on procreation as opposed to
sexual activity may, in part, explain why states do not prosecute HIV-positive
women for mother-to-child exposure in utero or childbirth, even though the risk of
vertical transmission is usually far higher than the risk of transmission through
sexual activity. 147

141. Illinois and Iowa prohibit activity that could transmit HIV, Indiana prohibits activity
that has been epidemiologically demonstrated to transmit HIV, regardless of the probability,
and Washington and Mississippi criminalize “exposure,” without clarifying if this must
reach a certain threshold probability. Only two states, South Dakota and Tennessee, require
the prosecution demonstrate that the conduct “presents a significant risk of HIV
transmission.” For statutes, see supra note 2.
142. See supra Part I.B.
143. See FEINBERG, supra note 20, at 191; Robinson, supra note 132, at 372.
144. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-1401 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:4-96 (West 2002); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1212 (McKinney 2011). States do,
however, use proxy-based rules to prohibit some types of reckless driving, most notably
driving under the influence of intoxication. The argument that rules are similarly appropriate
with regard to HIV exposure is addressed in Part II.E.2.
145. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 175–76 (discussing value of individual
interest in continuing intimate relationships).
146. See Baker, supra note 25, at 114.
147. Where a pregnant woman takes effective ART and takes other precautions such as
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Where the statute at issue criminalizes sexual conduct without disclosure of
serostatus, the fact finder should also consider the defendant’s interests in
non-disclosure. 148 An HIV-positive individual may have significant interests in
keeping her serostatus private. Individuals who disclose their status to others have
no control over subsequent disclosures by others and often find themselves
ostracized from their communities, turned away from their homes, and isolated
from their families and children. 149 Some who disclose their status face the prospect
of domestic violence. 150
Statutes that explicitly prohibit substantial and unjustifiable risk creation allow
juries to consider these factors and determine whether an individual’s specific
conduct merits criminalization. For example, a statute might prohibit an individual
from “engaging in conduct that creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
transmission.” While the meaning of “substantial and unjustifiable” is open to the
interpretation of the jury, the statute could provide guidance to juries in interpreting
the phrase “substantial and unjustifiable.” Based on the Model Penal Code text,
Paul Robinson has suggested that a risk is substantial and unjustifiable if “given its
nature, degree, and circumstances, its creation is a deviation from the standard of
care of a reasonable person.” 151
Defining criminal conduct in terms of substantial and unjustifiable risk of
infection also eliminates many of the troubling messages of current statutes
described in Part I.D. Unlike status- and activity-based statutes, criminalizing risk
does not imply that sex with an HIV-positive individual poses a separate harm
distinct from transmission risk. Drafting a statute to target risk makes clear—at

cesarean surgery prior to the rupture of membranes, transmission rates average 1–2%, a
higher rate than most sexual activity. While the risk will vary with each pregnancy, such a
risk of transmission for women who do not take ART and other precautions is on average
25%. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Achievements in Public Health:
Reduction in Perinatal Transmission of HIV Infection—United States, 1985–2005, 55
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 592 (2006).
148. While Larry Gostin has rejected the criminal law as an appropriate response to HIV,
he and James Hodge argue that the interest in avoiding an imminent threat of transmission is
greater than the interest in privacy. See Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercing
the Veil of Secrecy in HIV/AIDS and Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Theories of
Privacy and Disclosure in Partner Notification, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 9, 66–67
(1998); see also RONALD BAYER, PRIVATE ACTS, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES: AIDS AND THE
POLITICS OF PUBLIC HEALTH 230 (1989); Amitai Etzioni, HIV Sufferers Have a
Responsibility, TIME, Dec. 13, 1993, at 100. Scott Burris and South African Constitutional
Court Justice Edwin Cameron argue that issues of rights of privacy, autonomy, and
self-expression weigh against regulating sexual exposure except in rare circumstances of
significant culpability. Burris & Cameron, supra note 4, at 579; see also David L. Chambers,
Gay Men, AIDS, and the Code of the Condom, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 378–79
(1994).
149. See Wolf & Vezina, supra note 1, at 873–74; KLITZMAN & BAYER, supra note 36, at
104–06, 108–14.
150. See KLITZMAN & BAYER, supra note 36, at 38; Burris & Cameron, supra note 4, at
580; Cameron, supra note 4, at 11.
151. Robinson, supra note 132, at 377.

2012]

RETHINKING HIV-EXPOSURE CRIMES

1543

least to a greater extent than activity-based statutes—that activity is criminalized
only because of and to the extent that it poses a risk of transmission. 152
Criminalizing only substantial and unjustifiable risk has a benefit that is
particularly valuable in the context of an offense based on emerging medical
science: it allows the law to adjust to changing knowledge. The offense can adapt
to new evidence regarding HIV transmission, new prevention methods, and more
successful HIV treatments. This is particularly important in light of the way recent
research and more effective ART have drastically changed our understanding of
transmission risks for individuals with low viral loads. 153 Research concluding that
certain individuals on successful ART without STIs are noninfectious was
published as recently as 2008, and the impact of viral load on transmission is not
yet entirely understood. 154 This impact is also likely to change as ART becomes
more effective at reducing viral load. Advances in prevention measures, such as
microbicides and additional barrier methods, will affect transmission risk. 155 More
effective HIV treatment may also change the severity of the underlying harm of
HIV infection. Just as HIV is no longer the death sentence it was twenty-five years
ago, it will likely become a much less serious condition as treatments and
prognoses improve. 156 A statute that prohibits substantial and unjustifiable risk
allows courts to consider all of this evidence.
Prohibiting conduct based on risk also better addresses the potential
underinclusiveness of current statutes by allowing courts to consider cumulative
risks. The fact that most transmission requires multiple acts of intercourse supports
the possibility that the risk of a single sex act might be too remote and speculative
to justify criminalization. Yet cumulative risks across multiple sexual acts may
pose a risk of sufficient magnitude to justify criminalization.

152. There is nothing about the harm of HIV transmission that merits an exception to the
principle that risks should be substantial and unjustifiable to merit criminalization; indeed,
such an exception would be inconsistent with the policy goal of eliminating the stigma of
HIV and discrimination against individuals based on their HIV status. See Sch. Bd. of
Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987) (discussing purpose of Rehabilitation Act
to eliminate discrimination based on mythology associated with stigmatized communicable
disease).
153. See Grant, supra note 8, at 400–01 (discussing how advancements in ART have
allowed lower viral loads, and the impact this has on the risk of transmission is considered
significant enough to merit criminalization).
154. See MYKHALOVSKIY ET AL., supra note 53, at 32–33; Bernard, supra note 71.
155. Cf. Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 185–86 (noting, in 1988, that ordinary
condoms might not be considered sufficient prevention methods in the future if better
condoms were available).
156. For example, scholarship written before advances in ART often equated HIV
transmission as causing death. These articles discussed the potential for liability for murder
or attempted murder and questioned the usefulness of assault and endangerment statutes
because they were not offenses associated with causing death. See, e.g., Sullivan & Field,
supra note 7, at 169.
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B. Limiting Criminalization to Culpable Mental States
HIV-exposure statutes should require mental culpability with regard to
transmission. 157 An individual who creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
harm may have varying levels of culpability with respect to that harm. 158 Holding
an individual strictly liable for risk would unfairly criminalize a host of conduct
based solely on her serostatus. HIV-exposure statutes should require a culpable
mental state with respect to the ultimate harm at issue: HIV transmission.
The Model Penal Code defines four different types of mentes reae, which have
been adopted by several states in some form: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and
negligently. 159 In the context of HIV transmission, a mens rea of “purposely”
would require that it is the defendant’s object to cause another to contract HIV. 160
A mere suspicion that transmission might occur, or even a belief that it will occur,
would be insufficient if transmission is not the defendant’s conscious object. 161 A
mens rea of “knowingly” would require that the defendant is practically certain that
her conduct will cause HIV transmission to another. 162 These two mentes reae are
likely to be the most rare and difficult to prove. Few individuals desire to harm
their sexual partners by transmitting HIV to them, and if an individual is even
marginally familiar with the low probability of transmission, she will not be
“practically certain” that transmission will result through her conduct. 163
Recklessness under the Model Penal Code would require an individual to be aware
of, and consciously disregard, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that her conduct
would result in HIV transmission. 164 Negligence does not require awareness of this
risk; it is sufficient that the individual should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk her conduct will result in transmission. 165

157. See Cahill, supra note 30, at 936–37; HUSAK, supra note 17, at 174–75. In the
context of attempt offenses prevented by factual impossibility, an individual need only have
the requisite culpability for attempt and need not have created an actual risk. The specific
intent to cause the result, or belief the result will occur, is generally required for an offense
of attempt. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1962); Cahill, supra note 30, at 896–907. This
would be more straightforward in a statute that punished transmission—an individual could
be convicted of attempted transmission if she intended to transmit but failed because it was
impossible to do so (if, for example, she mistakenly believed she was HIV positive).
However, in risk-creation statutes, attempt and factual impossibility analysis is somewhat
more confusing and is beyond the scope of this Article. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE
AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 161–64 (1997); Cahill, supra note 30, at 889; Simons,
supra note 137, at 484 n.119.
158. Cf. Robinson, supra note 132, at 375 (arguing that, under the Model Penal Code,
one can create a substantial and unjustifiable risk but not necessarily do so with a mens rea
of “recklessly”).
159. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2) (1985).
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 1042; Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 179.
164. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2).
165. See id.
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Most HIV-exposure statutes do not require the prosecution to prove a mens rea
as to the harm of transmission. As discussed in Part I.C, several states require only
an individual’s knowledge of her serostatus, with perhaps an additional requirement
that she understand that sexual activity may cause transmission. 166 This knowledge
alone serves as proof of a mens rea of recklessness or perhaps merely negligence;
the statutes seem to presume that an individual is aware of and ignores—or at the
very least should be aware of—a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
prohibited conduct will result in HIV transmission.
This presumption is unwarranted. An individual cannot be reckless without
some awareness of the substantial and unjustifiable risk her conduct poses. As
discussed in Part I.B, an individual who is HIV positive does not necessarily—and
indeed often will not—pose a substantial and unjustifiable risk of transmission to
an individual through sexual conduct. 167 A reasonable but mistaken belief can also
affect mental culpability. For example, if an individual falsely believes she has an
undetectable viral load, this factor affects the determination of whether she was
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. The reasonableness of her belief is
relevant to determining whether she was negligent.
Rather than using this proxy, legislatures should explicitly require a mental state
as to transmission. For example, legislatures that determine that reckless conduct
should be criminally liable should require the prosecutor to demonstrate that the
defendant ignored a substantial and unjustifiable risk of transmission. 168 Finders of
fact could then consider factors such as whether the defendant was aware of her
serostatus and her understanding of how HIV is transmitted. This would allow, for
example, a defendant to argue that she believed that her viral load was
undetectable, or that she has a mental defect that prevents her from understanding
her transmission risk. In contrast, legislatures may determine that individuals
should only be prosecuted if they demonstrate intent to transmit the virus, an
approach that has been taken in three states. 169 An individual’s knowledge of her
serostatus, condom use, or low viral load, may be relevant to the question of
whether she intended to infect her partner. 170
Requiring a mens rea of recklessness or negligence not only remedies the
problem of overinclusive legislation but also remedies a potential gap in current
legislation. HIV-exposure statutes that define mens rea in terms of knowledge of
serostatus do not allow prosecution of individuals who act recklessly without
knowing their serostatus. Arguably, an individual may be unaware of her serostatus

166. See supra Part I.C.
167. See supra Part I.B.
168. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(c) (defining “recklessly” as conscious disregard of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk).
169. California, Oklahoma, and Washington require an intent to transmit or inflict bodily
harm. Virginia requires this intent for a felony conviction, but allows misdemeanor
conviction where the defendant was aware of her positive serostatus. For statutes, see supra
note 2.
170. See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 209 P.3d 696 (Kan. 2009) (defendant’s low viral load
evidence of lack of intent to transmit).
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and yet understand that there is a significant possibility she is HIV positive and
engaging in activity that poses a substantial risk of transmission. 171
Criminalizing the conduct of such individuals raises the concern that prosecutors
and juries will target unpopular communities that are more likely (or merely
perceived as more likely) to fall into this category. For example, a jury may
conclude that an individual who engages in unprotected anal sex should be aware
of a risk that he is HIV positive and poses a risk to other partners. 172 This
conclusion is likely to disproportionately affect gay men. 173 But fair application of
the substantial and unjustifiable risk standard should mitigate this concern because
individuals are extremely unlikely to be liable if they do not know their
serostatus. 174 In order to demonstrate that an individual who did not know her
serostatus was reckless, a prosecutor must prove that the risk the individual was
aware of is substantial and unjustifiable. For example, if an individual believed
there was a 50% chance she was HIV positive, and her conduct posed a .5% risk of
transmission, the prosecutor must demonstrate that the risk the defendant was
aware of—a .25% chance of transmission—was substantial and unjustifiable.
This Article argues that statutes should require a mens rea as to transmission; it
does not provide a conclusion as to what that mens rea should be. Whatever mens
rea a statute requires, however, the offense should punish HIV exposure only to the
extent that the criminal code punishes similar risks with similar mentes reae. This
eliminates the problematic nature of current statutes, which generally afford much
harsher punishments for conviction under HIV-exposure statutes than other statutes
involving risk creation.
C. Limiting Criminalization to Unassumed Risk
1. Consent to Risk Should Preclude Liability
Consent plays a fickle role in criminal law. Consent can be, in Heidi Hurd’s
words, “morally magical,” eliminating or reducing a defendant’s culpability. 175 The
transformative effect of consent is most obvious where lack of consent is an
explicit element of the crime, most notably in sexual assault. 176 Consent may also
be an implicit defense to a crime. An incursion is only trespass when an individual

171. See Eric L. Schulman, Note, Sleeping with the Enemy: Combatting the Sexual
Spread of HIV-AIDS Through a Heightened Legal Duty, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 957, 987–
89 (1996) (discussing constructive awareness of serostatus).
172. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 1051–52.
173. See id.; see also Amy L. McGuire, Comment, AIDS as a Weapon: Criminal
Prosecution of HIV Exposure, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1787, 1797 (1999).
174. See Baker, supra note 25, at 108 (arguing that an individual must have actual
knowledge that she has HIV in order to know she poses a substantial and unjustifiable risk to
others).
175. Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, in 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 140 (1996);
see also VERA BERGELSON, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND VICTIMS’ WRONGS: COMPARATIVE
LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW 99 (2009).
176. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61 (2011); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 2011).
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is “not licensed or privileged” to enter the property—a consented-to incursion is a
visit. 177
It is often unclear what effect consent to risk of a bodily injury such as HIV
transmission has on criminal culpability. 178 Although consent can eliminate
liability—boxing and tandem sky-diving are legal if the “victim” has given
consent—it is not clear whether and when it does so. The Model Penal Code, for
example, allows consent to act as a defense for offenses that cause or threaten
serious bodily harm where “the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable
hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport or
other concerted activity not forbidden by law.” 179 Though the parameters of this
defense are far from clear, it has been adopted in whole or in part by several
criminal statutes. 180
Individuals should not be criminally liable for engaging in sexual activity that
poses a risk of HIV transmission if their partners have consented to that risk. 181
Where a partner has consented to a risk of transmission, state regulation subjects
both parties to excessive intrusion into consensual sexual relations. 182
Criminalization would prohibit a valuable and intimate part of relationships for
serodiscordant couples, potentially consign HIV-positive individuals to a life of
celibacy, and interfere with couples’ ability to procreate. 183 It is also difficult to
justify prohibiting consensual sexual relations in which a partner is aware of the
risk of a chronic disease while allowing individuals to consent to dangerous sports
that risk serious physical harm and death, such as B.A.S.E. jumping, rodeo, or
boxing. 184

177. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221 (1962); see also Heidi M. Hurd, Blaming the Victim: A
Response to the Proposal That Criminal Law Recognize a General Defense of Contributory
Responsibility, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 503, 504 (2005).
178. In tort law, consent to a risk is termed “assumption of the risk,” and may eliminate
liability if the individual consented to the specific risk at issue. Assumption of the risk is a
form of consent—it is consent to undertake a certain risk of harm. See BERGELSON, supra
note 175, at 97; Hurd, supra note 177, at 509; Jason M. Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs, 60
VAND. L. REV. 1749, 1770–71 (2007) (discussing meaning of “assumption of risk”).
179. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(2)(a).
180. See BERGELSON, supra note 175, at 18, 172–73 n.61 (outlining statutes).
181. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 1054.
182. See id.; Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 168, 173–74 (arguing the government
should use greater restraint in policing intimate activity).
183. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 1054; Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 168, 173–74;
see also Baker, supra note 25, at 114 (acknowledging that criminalization of sex where
partner consents to risk could inhibit procreation). But see Cheryl Hanna, Rethinking
Consent in a Big Love Way, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 111, 127–30 (2010) (describing
feminist literature arguing that perhaps the desire for intimacy and love can lead to situations
in which the law ought not to respect a harmful choice made out of love); Matthew Weait,
Harm, Consent and the Limits of Privacy, 13 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 97, 102–04 (2005)
(discussing feminist objections to autonomy-based arguments for allowing harmful sexual
acts).
184. See BERGELSON, supra note 175, at 15; Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 168
(arguing that the Model Penal Code approach is flawed if it does not allow a defense of
informed consent). But see Baker, supra note 25, at 104–14. It is not clear whether the
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The defense that a partner was aware of the defendant’s status demonstrates that
legislatures generally agree that it is improper to prohibit serodiscordant couples
from engaging in sexual relationships where the uninfected partner understands the
risk of transmission and assumes it. 185 Similarly, scholarship on this issue almost
universally agrees that criminalization is inappropriate where there is such
consent. 186 The next Section proposes an approach to consent that differs from
current HIV-exposure statutes and scholarship in the application of this principle.
2. Consent to Degree of Risk Should Preclude Liability
Consent to risk is a matter of degree. In every activity there is always some risk
of an unwanted consequence. Yet consenting to a certain activity does not mean
one is consenting to any degree of risk. In the context of sexual conduct, an
individual always consents to some risk, however remote, of HIV transmission.
Burris and Cameron argue that “rational people operating with genuine autonomy
should recognize exposure as a normal risk of sexual behavior.” 187 Yet the degree
of risk a person recognizes will differ depending on the information available to her
and the context of the relationship. She decides whether to engage in the activity by
assessing the risk of transmission given her knowledge of her partner, the type of
sexual activity at issue, the use of condoms, and other relevant factors, then
weighing this risk against her interests in the sexual activity.
Because individuals should not be liable for risk to which their partners consent,
criminalization is not appropriate unless there is a difference between the degree of
risk to which an individual consents and the degree of risk to which she is actually
exposed. If an individual consents to a 0.2% risk of transmission, and there is
actually a 2% risk of transmission, she did not consent to the full risk of
transmission to which she was exposed. This approach is consistent with the
principle that only wrongful harms should be criminalized, and an injury is not
wrongful to the extent the victim consented to it. 188 For example, if an individual
consents to the defendant piercing her ear once, but the defendant pierces her ear
Model Penal Code would allow consent to serve as a defense because it is not clear whether
consensual sexual conduct would fall within the Model Penal Code definition of a
“concerted activity not forbidden by law.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11; BERGELSON, supra
note 175, at 21. Dennis J. Baker argues that one cannot consent to something that violates
human dignity, such as a substantial risk of serious and irrevocable bodily harm, and uses
HIV transmission as a specific example. See Baker, supra note 25, at 104–14. Baker
distinguishes risks that come with some social value and those that do not, distinguishing
risk of harm through sexual exposure that will result in procreation from sexual exposure for
the sake of sex. See id. at 114. While the amount of value inherent in sexual gratification is
arguable (and variable), there is no reason to consider it minimal compared to other conduct
that involves risk of serious bodily harm. Baker, for example, would allow consent to
cosmetic surgery or sports, despite their risk of harm. See id. at 118–19.
185. Of the statutes cited supra note 2 of this Article, only Maryland does not indicate
that a partner’s awareness of status is a defense. See also BERGELSON, supra note 175, at 23
(discussing consensual transmission of HIV to those who want to become HIV positive).
186. See, e.g., Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 168–69; Shriver, supra note 8, at 350–
51. But see Baker, supra note 25, at 104–14.
187. Burris & Cameron, supra note 4, at 579.
188. See BERGELSON, supra note 175, at 63–64 (discussing consent).
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twice, then only the unconsented-to injury—the second piercing—is wrongful. 189
Similarly, in the context of risk, the relevant risk for determining a defendant’s
liability is the risk that exceeds that to which the victim consented.
Criminal liability is also inappropriate unless the unassumed risk is substantial
and unjustifiable. As argued in Part II.C.1, individuals should not be criminally
liable for exposing their partners to risk of transmission if that risk is insubstantial
or justifiable. 190 Nor should individuals be criminally liable for a risk of
transmission to which their partners consent. It follows that the unassumed risk
must be substantial and unjustifiable to merit criminalization.
Statutes should also limit criminal liability to defendants who have a culpable
mens rea with regard to their partner’s consent. An HIV-positive individual may
mistakenly believe that her partner is aware of her serostatus, which may lead her
to overestimate the degree of risk to which her partner has consented. 191 For the
reasons outlined in Part II.B’s discussion of culpability and risk, such mistaken
beliefs are relevant to an individual’s moral blameworthiness. 192 A mens rea
requirement of some sort would ensure that the law punishes only morally
blameworthy conduct. For example, instead of merely considering the risk to which
the partner consented, a fact finder would consider the risk to which the defendant
reasonably or non-recklessly believed her partner consented. Depending on the
mens rea specified, the defendant’s knowledge, recklessness, or negligence with
regard to the factors relevant to determining consent—such as her partner’s
awareness of the defendant’s serostatus or viral load, or her partner’s awareness
that a condom was not being used—would be relevant to demonstrating the
requisite mens rea with regard to consent. Conviction would still be appropriate
where the defendant knew that her partner was not consenting to the risk of
transmission to which her partner was exposed, or where the defendant was
reckless or even negligent with regard to her partner’s consent to risk. Yet this
approach would not punish an individual who honestly and reasonably believed her
partner consented to the actual risk.
In application, determining the difference in the degree of assumed risk and the
degree of actual risk will not change the outcome in many situations. Where the
actual risk was not substantial and unjustifiable, the defendant will not be guilty,
regardless of the degree to which her partner consented. For example, where an
individual engaged in receptive vaginal sex, had no STIs, and had an undetectable
viral load, it is unlikely she exposed her partner to a substantial and unjustifiable
risk; therefore the degree of risk to which her partner consented is immaterial.
Where risk was substantial but the victim assumed the actual risk, the defendant
would also be found not guilty. For example, where a partner knew a defendant
was HIV positive and was aware the defendant was not taking ART or using a
condom and nonetheless consented, conviction would not be warranted. Similarly,
where the actual risk was substantial and the individual clearly assumed only a very

189. See id.
190. See supra Part II.C.1.
191. In contrast, an HIV-positive individual may mistakenly believe her partner has not
consented to the risk of transmission. In order to limit the scope of this Article, I do not
address the admittedly fascinating issues of attempt and impossibility in this context.
192. See supra Part II.B.
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negligible risk—for example, where an individual was in a monogamous
relationship with a defendant who showed her doctored test results—then a
complex calculation is not necessary to determine that the unassumed risk was
substantial.
The proposed approach would change the outcome where an individual was
aware of some degree, but not all, of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. A may
engage in sex with B, knowing that B is HIV positive, but erroneously believing
that they are using a condom during intercourse. B has engaged in conduct that
merits criminal liability unless the difference between the risk of transmission
inherent in sex with a condom and the risk of transmission inherent in sex without a
condom was not substantial and unjustifiable. 193 This requires the jury to consider
evidence that, for example, B’s viral load was sufficiently low that the difference in
the risk A consented to and the risk to which A was exposed was insubstantial. In
another example, C engages in sex with D without knowing D’s serostatus.
However, C does not want to use a condom. The jury must consider evidence that
the difference between the risk C consented to—unprotected sex with a person of
unknown status—and the risk to which C was exposed is insubstantial.
In addition to remedying the over- and underinclusive nature of the current
statutes, this approach allows criminal law to reflect how social cues shape consent
to certain degrees of risk. An HIV-positive individual may use verbal cues to
inform her partner of her serostatus, such as discussing her T-cell count or
medications, saying she tested negative but that “it was a while ago,” or saying that
her test results are not back yet. 194 She may use nonverbal cues, such as leaving
ART medication, brochures, or magazines for HIV-positive individuals where a
partner will see them. 195 An individual may also be aware of her partner’s status by
knowing other characteristics about her partner, such as the fact that her partner
lives in housing for HIV-positive individuals. 196 In some communities of gay men,
the “code of the condom” provides an unspoken framework for sexual interaction
in which condom use exempts partners from discussing HIV and disclosing their
status. 197 It is understood that HIV disclosure is more likely in relationships that
become more serious; there is a social norm of not discussing HIV in order for the
relationship to reach a more intimate stage in which it can be discussed safely. 198

193. For a discussion of rape by fraud, see supra Part I.A.
194. See KLITZMAN & BAYER, supra note 36, at 47; Lazzarini et al., supra note 11, at 248.
195. See KLITZMAN & BAYER, supra note 36, at 48; Lazzarini et al., supra note 11, at 248.
196. See, e.g., Amy Leigh Womack, HIV-Infected Macon Man Sentenced to Two Years in
Prison for Reckless Conduct, MACON TELEGRAPH, Jan. 12, 2009. The defendant’s partner
was aware that the defendant lived in housing for HIV-positive individuals. Id.
197. See generally Chambers, supra note 148; see also KLITZMAN & BAYER, supra note
36, at 57–58, 139–41; Lazzarini et al., supra note 11, at 249.
198. See Chambers, supra note 148, at 377–80; KLITZMAN & BAYER, supra note 36, at
57–58, 139–41; Lazzarini et al., supra note 11, at 249. This code is not universal nor is it
universally understood to mean the same thing. Some individuals interpret condom use as
demonstrating that a partner may be positive and is therefore taking precautions. See
KLITZMAN & BAYER, supra note 36, at 140. However, HIV-positive individuals may
interpret a partner’s lack of condom use as demonstrating the partner is also HIV positive
and therefore feels no need to take precautions. See id. at 155.
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These cues do not necessarily result in awareness of risk, but they are relevant in
determining the degree of risk to which the individual was aware and consented. 199
D. Sample Statute
The proposed framework radically changes HIV-exposure statutes. An offense
would require the prosecution to prove that the defendant exposed her partner to an
unassumed, substantial and unjustifiable risk, and that she had a culpable mental
state with regard to transmission. While statutes may differ in their phrasing, an
example of such a statute follows:
It is unlawful for an individual
(1) [with the purpose of infecting another with HIV]
(2) [who is aware of and ignores a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that her actions will result in HIV infection of another] 200
(3) [who should have been aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that her actions will result in HIV infection
of another]
to engage in conduct that creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
infecting another with HIV. For the purposes of this statute, the word
“creates” applies only to the degree of risk that the defendant
[knows/recklessly disregards a risk/should have known] the victim did
not consent to.
The bracketed areas represent different mentes reae that states could choose to
apply. Such a statute should grade offenses according to mens rea and ensure that
the offense does not punish violations more severely than comparable offenses. 201

199. The cues can be ambiguous, and their meaning may differ depending on the social
context. Mentioning a previous partner’s illness, for example, may provide a different cue in
the gay-male community, whose history of disproportionate HIV infection and active
involvement in HIV education and prevention has resulted in more sophisticated social cues
and codes in the context of risk awareness. See Chambers, supra note 148, at 378–80;
KLITZMAN & BAYER, supra note 36, at 46–48.
200. I do not write “recklessly engages in conduct that creates a substantial and
unjustifiable risk” because this phrasing could cause confusion. The Model Penal Code
defines recklessness as ignoring a substantial and unjustifiable risk. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.03 (1962). Requiring an individual to recklessly create a substantial and unjustifiable risk
could be interpreted as requiring an individual to ignore a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that she is creating a substantial and unjustifiable risk. I am proposing that the statute require
the individual to ignore a substantial and unjustifiable risk of transmission—not a risk of a
risk.
201. While attempt and impossibility are beyond the scope of this Article, I assume that
an individual who intends to transmit HIV but fails to create risk of transmission would still
be liable for an attempted violation of this statute.
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E. Counterarguments
1. It Will Not Change Outcomes
Statutes prohibiting only substantial and unjustifiable risk may still be
overinclusive or underinclusive in practice. Juries may construe “substantial and
unjustifiable risk” in a way that reflects jurors’ prejudices rather than actual risk of
transmission. 202 Prosecutors may interpret statutes based on fear and myth in the
context of HIV. For example, prosecutors have interpreted HIV as a deadly weapon
in the context of spitting or biting, despite the fact that HIV cannot be transmitted
by these methods. 203 A Michigan prosecutor charged an HIV-positive man under
the state bioterrorism statute for allegedly biting his neighbor’s lip during a fight. 204
While this charge was dismissed on appeal, several courts have allowed
prosecutions and convictions under endangerment or other offenses that require
substantial risk even where the conduct at issue involved negligible risk of HIV
transmission. 205
While these arguments raise valid concerns, the potential for misinterpretation
could be mitigated by statutory guidance as to what juries must consider in the
context of HIV. For example, the statute could make clear that, in the context of
HIV, substantial and unjustifiable risk must be demonstrated by current and
scientifically sound evidence regarding the particular characteristics of the conduct
at issue.
Disability law demonstrates the practicability of this approach. Juries have been
making similar determinations for decades under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 206 These statutes prohibit
discrimination against people with disabilities, including HIV, but defendants may
avoid liability if they can demonstrate that the discriminatory act was necessary in
order to prevent the plaintiff from posing a direct threat to others. 207 The direct

202. See Burris & Cameron, supra note 4, at 579 (arguing that risk assessments are
heavily influenced by psychological and social biases). Survey data suggests that fifty to
ninety-five percent of the public believes the probability of transmitting HIV from a single
sexual encounter is high. See Wolf & Vezina, supra note 1, at 860.
203. See, e.g., People v. Shawn, 107 P.3d 1033 (Colo. App. 2004). The defendant was
convicted of felony menacing with a deadly weapon where, when tackled to the ground, he
scratched another individual’s skin while yelling that he was HIV positive. Id.
204. Todd A. Heywood, Defendant in HIV-As-Terrorism Case Reaches Plea Deal,
MICHIGAN MESSENGER, Nov. 4, 2010.
205. See, e.g., Nash v. State, 881 N.E.2d 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (battery with bodily
waste prosecuted as a felony because individual was HIV positive); Burk v. State, 478
S.E.2d 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (reckless endangerment based on risk of transmission where
individual had bitten police officer); Shawn, 107 P.3d at 1033. Courts have rejected attempts
to prosecute on the grounds of insufficient evidence of risk in a few cases. See, e.g., Brock v.
State, 555 So. 2d 285 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (lack of scientific evidence that HIV is
transmitted via biting).
206. Americans with Disability Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327;
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355.
207. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284–88 (1987); see also
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649–50 (1998).
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threat analysis requires an individualized inquiry into the specific characteristics of
the discriminatory action at issue and the individual’s disability to determine
whether the plaintiff posed a direct threat. 208 The Supreme Court has advised courts
to take particular care in the context of contagious diseases to avoid conclusions
based on stereotypes or myths and directed lower courts to rely on evidence
supported by the medical community, with particular deference to public health
authorities. 209
Granted, although such guidance may mitigate the problem of fear-based
decisions in the context of HIV-exposure offenses, it is unlikely to eliminate them
entirely. In ADA and Rehabilitation Act cases, appellate courts have upheld direct
threat findings that were contrary to medical evidence. 210 In the context of criminal
law, an individualized inquiry of risk may not be sufficient to ensure only those
who pose substantial and unjustifiable risk of transmission are convicted. Finders
of fact may still be swayed by fear and prejudice.
But even if it cannot eliminate overbroad application of the law, the proposed
framework is still superior to the alternatives. The individualized inquiry at least
provides finders of fact the opportunity to make decisions based on medical
evidence rather than outdated knowledge, myth, or fear. Put simply, a statute that
may be interpreted in a way that is overbroad is better than a statute that is
necessarily overbroad.
2. Rules and Proxies Are a Necessary Evil
Another counterargument to the proposal is that, while proxies such as
serostatus and sexual activity may be overinclusive, they are necessary in order to
deter risky behavior. This argument reflects the ongoing debate about the use of
standards as opposed to rules in criminal law. 211 Standards provide general
guidelines that can be applied on a case-by-case basis depending on the facts. 212
“Reckless driving,” for example, employs a standard that requires a fact finder to
determine whether a defendant’s actions are sufficiently risky to constitute
recklessness. Rules, by contrast, delineate specific prohibited activities or outcomes
and tend to employ proxies to do so. 213 A speed limit, for example, creates a clear
rule for driving by using certain driving speeds as a proxy for recklessness.

208. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 284–88; see also Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 649–50.
209. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 284–88.
210. See, e.g., EEOC v. Prevo’s Family Market, Inc., 135 F.3d 1089 (6th Cir. 1998)
(vacating judgment for HIV-positive food service employee).
211. For discussions of the rules/standards debate, see ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note
137, at 295 & n.99; FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Cass R.
Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 969–96 (1995); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 383–90 (1985).
212. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 29 (2001); Sunstein,
supra note 211, at 959, 964–65; Schlag, supra note 211, at 379–83.
213. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 212, at 27, 30; Sunstein, supra note 211, at
959, 961–62.
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Most HIV-exposure offenses use rules rather than standards. They limit
fact-finder discretion in favor of legislative determinations. 214 For example, rather
than allowing a fact finder to determine whether a defendant’s given activity
exposed another to a substantial and unjustifiable risk on a case-by-case basis,
legislatures make this determination for the jury by using status and sexual activity
as proxies for substantial and unjustifiable risk. This situation leaves the fact finder
only to determine whether the defendant is HIV positive and engaged in the
prohibited activity. 215 The law is replete with statutes that use rules in the context
of risk creation, including driving with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit,
driving at speeds exceeding the legal limit, pretending to be a physician, engaging
in sexual activity with a minor, and possession offenses. 216
As Part I of this Article demonstrates, rules have several drawbacks. Most
notably, offenses that rely upon proxies tend to be both overinclusive and
underinclusive. 217 This violates the retributivist tenet that the criminal law should
not punish behavior unless it causes or risks harm and unless the defendant acts
with a blameworthy state of mind. 218 Proxy-based rules also result in the
proliferation of numerous statutes; rather than creating general endangerment
statutes, legislatures that rely on proxy-based rules create specific statutes that
designate particular behavior as presumptively risky. The proliferation of numerous
statutes prohibiting different specific activities often results in arbitrary differences
in punishment level and grossly disproportionate punishment. 219 As discussed in
Part I, HIV-exposure laws are nearly universally graded as felonies, with an
average maximum sentence of eleven years. 220 This stands in stark contrast to other

214. See Cahill, supra note 30, at 887–88; Sunstein, supra note 211, at 1012 (describing
the choice to use rules as presenting a principal-agent problem in which the legislature, the
principal, seeks to control the decisions of its agent, those who interpret and apply the law);
see also Eric A. Johnson, Mens Rea for Sexual Abuse: The Case for Defining the Acceptable
Risk, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMONOLOGY 1, 11–15 (2009) (arguing that, with offenses such as
DUIs and drug-induced homicide, the legislature makes antecedent determinations of
unreasonableness rather than delegating to the jury to make ad hoc determinations).
215. This is also a form of the larger concept of imputed liability advanced by Paul
Robinson. See Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 623–29,
652, 655–57 (1984).
216. See R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME 166–68 (2007); HUSAK, supra note 17, at
163, 167.
217. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 137, at 297; ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra
note 212, at 35, 53–54; SCHAUER, supra note 211, at 31–35, 39; Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S.
Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1086 (2004); Sunstein,
supra note 211, at 992–93, 995; Harry Surden, The Variable Determinacy Thesis, 12 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 88 (2011).
218. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 137, at 298, 300–02; DUFF, supra note 216,
at 168–71; Robinson, supra note 215, at 656; see also HUSAK, supra note 17, at 155–77;
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Self-Defense and the State, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 478 (2008).
While violating a law can be harmful in itself and may justify punishment, this fails to
provide an adequate justification for prohibiting the criminalized conduct in the first place.
See DUFF, supra note 216, at 168.
219. See Cahill, supra note 30, at 937.
220. See supra notes 124–130 and accompanying text.
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endangerment statutes. 221 It also far exceeds the maximum one-year sentence for
DUIs, which are graded as misdemeanors unless the defendant has previous DUI
convictions. 222
Rules are often employed despite these drawbacks because of their many
advantages. They give individuals clear notice as to the law’s requirements. 223
Using proxy-based rules also eases the burden on the prosecution; it is much easier
for prosecutors to demonstrate that an individual is HIV positive and engaged in
prohibited activity than to prove that an individual exposed another to a substantial
and unjustifiable risk of transmission. 224 Use of proxy-based rules also simplifies
the fact finder’s analysis. 225 It eliminates the need to consider medical evidence of
transmission risk or conflicting testimony about the defendant’s intent or
knowledge with respect to this risk. These simpler calculations may lead to more
consistent verdicts because they allow less fact finder discretion. 226
Using rules that employ proxies for underlying harms may also help deter risky
behavior more effectively than directly addressing the underlying harm and may
even encourage desirable social norms. Rules may deter risky behavior by
eliminating the possibility that an individual will be able to argue that her behavior
was not sufficiently risky to merit criminalization. 227 Rules may also deter people
from making poor risk calculations when they lack the information or ability to
judge risk accurately. 228 An individual who is intoxicated is likely to be in a poor
position to determine whether her driving poses a substantial and unjustifiable risk.
Related to this deterrence function is the power of proxy-based rules to change
social norms by establishing clear rules of unacceptable behavior. 229 Advocates of
HIV-exposure laws may argue that universal disclosure obligations will increase
norms of disclosure and openness in relationships. 230
In sum, rules and standards may each have a place in criminal law, but when to
employ either method may be hotly contested. Offenses that employ standards
directly target the harm at issue and avoid overinclusion and underinclusion.
Offenses that employ proxy-based rules may have greater deterrent value and fewer

221. See id.
222. See 7A AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles § 336 (2011).
223. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 212, at 30–31; ALEXANDER & FERZAN,
supra note 137, at 296; Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the
Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1015, 1052 (1997);
Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 803, 803–04 (2005).
224. See Robinson, supra note 215, at 620, 655–56.
225. See id. at 655–56; Schauer, supra note 223, at 803–04; Sunstein, supra note 211, at
973.
226. See DUFF, supra note 216, at 167; Sunstein, supra note 211, at 974–75, 977.
227. See Robinson, supra note 215, at 630–31.
228. See DUFF, supra note 216, at 169–70; Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The
Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1994); Sunstein, supra note 211,
at 970, 972 (arguing that rules enable people who are compromised by myopia, weakness of
will, confusion, venality, or bias to make decisions in individual cases).
229. See Sunstein, supra note 211, at 970.
230. But see Burris et al., supra note 11, at 467–68, 489–90 (stating that criminal laws
have no effect on disclosure).
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administrative costs, but these come at the expense of retributivist principles. In
order to preserve these principles, the presumption against proxy-based rules
should be overcome only after critical analysis. 231 In other words, the question
should not be, “why not use a proxy-based rule in this particular circumstance?”
but rather, “why use a proxy-based rule in this particular circumstance rather than
directly targeting the harm/mental state directly?”
Analyses of when and how to use proxy-based rules in endangerment offenses
often weigh common factors. One of these factors is the value of deterrence. 232
Deterrence may be especially valuable in certain circumstances, particularly when
individuals are likely to engage in substantially risky activity if allowed to
determine whether the activity is prohibitively risky on a case-by-case basis. 233
Another factor is whether the proxy-based rule accurately targets and deters the
harm for which the proxy stands. 234 A proxy-based rule may also be warranted
when legislators have information and expertise that is unavailable or prohibitively
costly to most individuals. 235 Weighing against rule use is the costs of
overinclusion on those whose actions fall within the rule but do not create a
blameworthy risk. Legal scholars often weigh these factors in different ways. 236 For
example, R.A. Duff argues that we should accept a proxy-based rule if it has a
particularly high deterrent value and the consequent prohibition of non-risky
behavior does not create an onerous burden. 237
These factors do not warrant the use of proxy-based rules in HIV-exposure
offenses and in fact reveal them to be particularly unsuitable. At first blush, HIV

231. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 137, at 300–02; DUFF, supra note 216, at
168–71; HUSAK, supra note 17, at 164–75 (arguing for a presumption against
overinclusiveness and limitations on implicit endangerment crimes); Dillof, supra note 223,
at 1061.
232. See DUFF, supra note 216, at 169–71; Robinson, supra note 215, at 656–57;
Sunstein, supra note 211, at 1003–04.
233. See DUFF, supra note 216, at 169–71; Sunstein, supra note 211, at 1003–04.
234. See Sunstein, supra note 211, at 1012 (arguing that we might prefer not to use rules
when there is no reason to distrust decision makers and when it is not possible to come up
with rules that fit well); see also Surden, supra note 217, at 88 (arguing that an effective
proxy requires a high degree of overlap between the factual situations covered in the rule and
in the standard).
235. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 137, at 296; Ferzan, supra note 218, at 477–
78; Sunstein, supra note 211, at 1003–04.
236. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 212, at 54 (a rule is rational and
morally desirable if it prevents more errors than it causes); DUFF, supra note 216, at 169–71;
Dillof, supra note 223, at 1054–55 (rules should not be employed unless, at minimum, the
use of rules results in less overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness than the use of a
standard); Robinson, supra note 215, at 656–57 (balance the costs of overinclusion with the
need for effective prosecution); Sunstein, supra note 211, at 1003–04 (rules are used when
the error rate of the particular rule is relatively low, the error rate of rulelessness is high, and
the number of cases is large); see also Ferzan, supra note 218, at 478 (describing this
trade-off and expressing doubt that a retributivist could justify it); Hurd & Moore, supra note
217, at 1086 (arguing that a rational penal code drafter might justifiably use proxies if proof
of the proxy’s target were impossible).
237. See DUFF, supra note 216, at 170–71.
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exposure seems like an area in which the value of deterrence might be particularly
high. Legislatures, with their numerous resources, might be better able to make
decisions about risk than individuals living with HIV. Deterring risky behavior is
also especially valuable given the profound consequences of HIV infection. But the
proliferation of HIV-exposure offenses that criminalize safe sex alternatives calls
into doubt the weight legislative expertise should be afforded in this context. In
practice, the overwhelming majority of legislatures have demonstrated significant
ignorance about the means that HIV is transmitted. 238 An individual under the
advice of her physician is at least as well positioned to determine whether her
conduct poses a substantial risk.
There is also significant reason to doubt the deterrent value of HIV-exposure
statutes. As discussed more fully in Part III.A, empirical studies have found that
HIV-exposure offenses have no deterrent effect. 239 On the contrary, public health
advocates have argued that HIV-exposure offenses may promote harmful rather
than positive attitudes and behaviors. 240 The laws may encourage individuals to
assume a partner is not HIV-positive unless the partner discloses otherwise. 241
These individuals may forego condom use and other precautions that would protect
them from infection. This is particularly problematic given that two-thirds of HIV
infections occur where the infected partner is unaware of her serostatus. 242 The use
of proxy-based rules in HIV-exposure laws also perpetuates myths about HIV
transmission. 243 As discussed in Part I, many of the sexual acts used as proxies for
risk are, in reality, highly unlikely to transmit HIV, and many acts (such as manual
stimulation or the use of sex toys) are encouraged as safe alternatives. 244 The
failure of these laws to account for condom or ART use may actually discourage
individuals from taking risk-reducing steps by perpetuating the belief that they
provide little or no protection against transmission. 245
The “fit” of the proxies also do not weigh in favor of using a rule over a
standard. Because of the many factors that influence risk and the ways these factors
interact, proxies such as sexual activities or knowledge of serostatus are a poor fit
for the harm HIV-exposure laws seek to prevent. As discussed in Part I, these
proxies are vastly overinclusive, reinforce negative stereotypes, and spread
misinformation. Even more problematic is the stagnant nature of proxy-based rules.
Over the past three decades, new information and scientific advancements have

238. See supra Part I.B.
239. See infra Part III.A.
240. See infra Part III.A.
241. See Barry D. Adam, Richard Elliot, Winston Husbands, James Murray & John
Maxwell, Effects of the Criminalization of HIV Transmission in Cuerrier on Men Reporting
Unprotected Sex with Men, 23 CAN. J. L. & SOC’Y 143, 149–50 (2008).
242. Burris et al., supra note 11, at 476–77; Grant, supra note 8, at 399.
243. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 212, at 89–90; Alexander & Sherwin, supra
note 228, at 1215 (arguing that rules that “miss the mark” hamper rather than assist
autonomous choice).
244. See Galletly & Pinkerton, supra note 3, at 329 (discussing use of sex toys and
manual stimulation as risk-free alternatives to intercourse with an HIV-positive person);
Shriver, supra note 8, at 325–26.
245. See Adam et al., supra note 241, at 149–50.
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changed our understanding of HIV-transmission risk and what it means to be HIV
positive. While the standard-based approach proposed above can adapt to these
changes, a rule-based approach cannot. Poorly fitted proxies are likely to become
even worse with time.
Nor is this a circumstance in which, as Duff describes, the burdens of
overinclusion are not onerous. A rule-based approach is likely to require numerous
individuals who do not pose a substantial or unjustifiable risk to their partners to
abstain from sexual activity or disclose their serostatus to their partners. As
discussed in Part II.B, this raises the prospect of domestic violence, loss of family
and community support, and discrimination. 246 These requirements are particularly
troubling in the context of the consensual intimate relationships of a marginalized
and stigmatized community. 247
One factor that may weigh in favor of a proxy-based rule in these circumstances
is notice. Bright-line rules provide clearer notice of prohibited activities than
standards, which are open to interpretation. An HIV-positive individual who seeks
to conform his conduct to the law might interpret “substantial and unjustifiable
risk” differently than a prosecutor and jury.
This is a legitimate concern, though not necessarily a fatal one. Criminal law
routinely punishes acts through similar standards. For example, while driving while
intoxicated is prohibited by a rule specifying a blood-alcohol limit, driving while
drowsy or ill is not; the question of whether a driver creates a substantial and
unjustifiable risk in these states is decided on an individual basis through reckless
driving or reckless endangerment statutes. 248 Drivers must consider factors such as
the extent of their drowsiness and the driving conditions (e.g., whether it is dark,
the weather is hazardous, or the area is heavily populated). An HIV-positive
individual may make similar determinations of whether certain conduct is reckless
based on factors such as her viral load, the type of sexual activity, and the use of
condoms.
The value of notice may also be overrated where acts are specifically prohibited
by proxy-based rules, as Doug Husak has argued. 249 For example, a DUI statute
prohibits driving with a certain blood-alcohol level. But the notice provided by
such a bright-line rule is rarely required because few individuals who have been
drinking actually know their blood-alcohol level before deciding whether to
drive. 250 Rather, they determine whether their actions have impaired their ability to
drive based on factors such as how many drinks they have consumed in a certain

246. See supra notes 142–150 and accompanying text.
247. See Burris & Cameron, supra note 4, at 579 (“Regulation of sex implicates rights of
privacy, autonomy, and self-expression, not to be abridged without a compelling
justification.”); Cameron, supra note 4, at 14–15 (arguing, while we implement traffic
regulations in order to deter risky behavior, these regulations do not stigmatize communities
in the same way as HIV-exposure criminalization and do not have dire consequences to
violators).
248. See Husak, supra note 133, at 621–22.
249. See id. at 624.
250. See id.
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amount of time, how long it has been since their last drink, their size, and whether
they have eaten while drinking. 251
In sum, the mere fact that criminal law contains myriad rule-based offenses is
insufficient to justify their use in the context of HIV-exposure crimes. With perhaps
the exceptions of notice and prosecutorial ease, the factors that may justify a
rule-based approach are absent for HIV exposure, and where they are present, these
factors do not outweigh the many detriments of proxy-based rules in this context.
3. The Consent Analysis Is Too Difficult to Execute
Related to the rules/standards critique is the counterargument that the proposed
framework requires fact finders to make determinations about consent and risk that
are simply too complex to expect of the average juror. In a game of Russian
Roulette, such a calculus would be simple. If an individual consented to the
defendant firing a gun with one round in it, and the defendant actually loaded three
rounds into the gun, then we could easily calculate the degree of unassumed risk.
The victim consented to a one in six chance of being shot and was exposed to a
three in six chance of being shot; thus, she did not consent to an additional two in
six chance of being shot. But calculations of HIV-transmission risk in sexual
relationships are unlikely to yield such precise numbers. Individuals rarely quantify
the probabilities of harm they anticipate will befall them. 252 Because it is often
difficult to determine what risk they consented to, it is difficult to determine
whether they consented to the actual risk they faced and the distinction, if any,
between the two. Critics of the proposal may argue that awareness of HIV status as
a proxy for awareness of risk is a necessary oversimplification, even if it does result
in overinclusive statutes. 253
Yet it is hardly clear that this oversimplification is necessary. The difficulty of
determining precisely what risk an individual is aware of does not preclude
determinations of consent in other situations. The Model Penal Code, for example,
allows a defense of consent when an injury is a “reasonably foreseeable hazard[] of
joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport or other
concerted activity not forbidden by law.” 254 In practice, this requires fact finders to
determine what risks were “reasonably foreseeable” in contexts ranging from
professional football to dancing the hora at a wedding. Even if this particular
standard is not the ideal formulation, it demonstrates that a statute can provide
guidance for a jury’s determination of whether an individual consented to a risk

251. Indeed, the value of notice in the context of HIV-exposure laws may be called into
doubt based on their apparent lack of deterrent effect. See infra Part III.A.
252. See Hanna, supra note 183, at 127–29 (arguing that love can cloud such judgments);
Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 EMORY L.J. 1,
118–19 (1993) (arguing that allocation of legal responsibility most likely comes to mind
after the accident occurred).
253. For a discussion of the need to exercise care in accepting this reasoning, see supra
Part II.E.2.
254. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11 (1962). It is not clear whether sexual activity falls within
the definition of a “concerted activity not forbidden by law.” BERGELSON, supra note 175, at
21.
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even where, as in both sports and sexual activity, it is not easy to determine what
awareness an individual had about the relevant facts that influenced risk.
The complexity of the proposed framework is also one of its strengths.
Awareness of transmission risk comes in many forms and many degrees, and the
law should allow juries to probe these nuances and allow defendants to provide
evidence that their behavior was not wrongful. 255 This is particularly relevant in the
context of intimate sexual relationships, in which subtle cues and unspoken
agreements may influence consent to risk. 256 A jury may reasonably distinguish, for
example, the degree of risk assumed when an individual engages in unprotected sex
with a stranger from the degree of risk assumed when an individual engages in sex
with a partner whose negative test result she has seen and with whom she believes
she has a monogamous sexual relationship. Even if neither of these individuals
consented to the actual degree of risk to which they were exposed, the differences
in the degree of risk to which they did consent may be starkly different. 257
Criminalizing only the degree of risk to which a partner did not consent, and only
when that risk is substantial and unjustifiable, allows juries to distinguish these
situations.
4. It Provides a Troubling Defense for Rapists
In the context of HIV, the proposed framework allows a jury to consider a
victim’s awareness of characteristics about her partner—such as whether he
mentioned a past partner who was HIV positive or whether she saw his HIV
medication—when determining whether the victim consented to risk. Allowing a
jury to consider a victim’s knowledge of the defendant’s characteristics to

255. Cf. Matthew Weait, Taking the Blame: Criminal Law, Social Responsibility and the
Sexual Transmission of HIV, 23 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 441, 449–50 (2001) (arguing
that the binary model of victim-perpetrator does not adequately capture the complexity of
sexual transmission). This approach may require courts to resolve what facts a jury may
consider in determining the degree of risk to which an individual consents. Arguably, factors
such as seeing an individual’s HIV medication would be relevant if it could be shown that
the individual was thereby aware of a greater possibility that her partner was HIV positive—
a factor relevant to the risk of transmission she was assuming. However, some factors seem
more troubling to allow or encourage a jury to consider. For example, HIV rates are
disproportionately high in the African American community. See PHILL WILSON, KAI
WRIGHT & MICHAEL T. ISBELL, BLACK AIDS INST., LEFT BEHIND: BLACK AMERICA: A
NEGLECTED PRIORITY IN THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 17–24 (2008) (documenting
disproportionate HIV rates among African Americans); Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, Disparities in Diagnoses of HIV Infection Between Blacks/African Americans
and Other Racial/Ethnic Populations—37 States, 2005–2008, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 93, 94 (2011). Yet it is concerning to say that an individual was consenting to a
greater risk of transmission because of the race of her partner. While the exact parameters of
what juries should be allowed to consider is beyond the scope of this Article, statutes and
courts could provide guidance to determine the parameters of what juries could consider in
such situations.
256. See Lazzarini et al., supra note 11, at 247 (discussing the complex ways individuals
weigh risks and consent in sexual relationships).
257. See Weait, supra note 183, at 106.
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determine whether there was consent to risk could be troubling if applied to rape.
An individual has not consented to sex simply because she knew information about
her date that might lead her to believe that her date would be violent or
threatening. 258
HIV exposure and rape are distinguishable because of the acts they prohibit and
the types of consent they require. A defendant is guilty of rape when she engages in
sexual activity without the victim’s consent, not when she exposes her partner to a
risk of sexual activity. 259 The fact finders in a rape case must determine whether the
victim consented to the sexual activity, not whether the victim consented to the
defendant creating a risk of the victim being raped. 260 Being aware of
characteristics of a person that indicate she may sexually assault you may evince
assumption of a risk of the assault occurring. But only consent to the sex itself
negates the wrongfulness of the assault. 261 Assuming a risk of being forced to have
sex without your consent does not evince consent to sexual intercourse—indeed, it
cannot, since what you are risking is sex without consent. By contrast,
HIV-exposure statutes criminalize the creation of risk. The consent defense
requires a determination of whether an individual consented to risk, and to what
degree that consent is fully voluntary. 262
III. IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
A. The HIV Criminalization Debate
The Introduction to this Article identified two branches of scholarship
concerning HIV-exposure crimes: (1) the determination of what conduct merits
criminalization, and (2) arguments about the benefits and costs of criminalization.
This Article focuses primarily on the first branch of scholarship. Yet its conclusions
have implications for the second branch. It strengthens consequentialist arguments
against criminalization by limiting offenses to narrow categories of rare conduct.
While its focus is to present a better way to criminalize HIV exposure, it

258. See BERGELSON, supra note 175, at 98; Hurd, supra note 177, at 512; Hurd, supra
note 175, at 125–26. But see David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal
Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1333–52 (1997) (arguing that juries
nullify rape law by importing the tort concept of contributory negligence or assumption of
risk, acquitting defendant when they believe victim acted carelessly).
259. Often rape is defined as sex without consent and with the use of force, or sex with
the use of force, but it is widely accepted that the absence of consent is an essential element
in rape. When force is required, it has been criticized as merely an evidentiary requirement
of lack of consent turned into a separate element. See Estrich, supra note 38, at 1095–1100;
see also PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF
CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 201–10 (2004) (discussing the relationship
between force and nonconsent in rape law).
260. See Hurd, supra note 177, at 511–12.
261. See id.; see also BERGELSON, supra note 175, at 99–100.
262. A victim’s knowledge of the defendant’s characteristics is also relevant to the
underlying issue of consent in both rape and HIV exposure because it may influence the
extent to which the victim’s consent was fully voluntary.
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consequently strengthens arguments that the best choice may be to eliminate all
HIV-exposure offenses.
The proposed HIV-exposure statute serves retributivist goals that are likely to
arise only in rare circumstances. Of the entire U.S. population, there are
approximately one million individuals living with HIV. 263 Of this population,
approximately 683,000 are aware of their HIV-positive status. 264 Those who are
unaware of their serostatus are unlikely to have the requisite mental state. Given the
low likelihood of transmission, substantial and unjustifiable risk may also be rare,
much less substantial and unjustifiable risk with a culpable mental state as to
transmission. At the very least, the approach proposed in Part II prohibits what is
likely to be on average a much narrower category of conduct than the overinclusive
offenses that most states employ.
The proposed HIV-exposure statute may also serve consequentialist goals by
deterring harmful behavior and encouraging socially desirable behavior. 265 Statutes
that criminalize conduct that poses a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
transmission may discourage risky conduct, or at least encourage individuals to
ensure that partners consent to the substantial and unjustifiable risk. 266 They may
also encourage individuals to minimize risks by using condoms, adhering to ART,
and seeking testing and treatment for STIs.
But empirical evidence undermines consequentialist arguments in favor of
HIV-exposure offenses. The most thorough of the few empirical studies on the
topic interviewed nearly 500 individuals in New York and Illinois who were HIV
positive or at elevated risk to ascertain what effect HIV-exposure statutes had on
individual behavior. 267 The study found that legal requirements had no impact on
individuals’ behaviors; those who believed the law prohibited exposure and
required disclosure were just as likely to engage in risky sexual activities or fail to
disclose to partners as those who did not share these beliefs. 268 Legal requirements
also failed to affect social norms. Regardless of whether they lived in a state with
an HIV-exposure statute or believed that the law prohibited exposure or required
disclosure, most people interviewed believed that it is wrong to expose others to
HIV infection and that HIV-positive individuals should disclose their serostatus to
partners. 269 Similarly, a 2003 study analyzing the impact of criminal laws on HIV
transmission in several states concluded that HIV-exposure laws were unlikely to
reduce HIV transmission. 270 The deterrent value of these statutes is further
undermined by the fact that one-third of HIV-positive individuals do not know they

263. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HIV IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
OVERVIEW (2010).
264. Id.
265. See Lazzarini et al., supra note 11, at 239 (discussing potential deterrent value of
HIV-transmission statutes); Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 187 (same); Wolf & Vezina,
supra note 1, at 843 (outlining deterrence argument but dismissing it).
266. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 187.
267. See Burris et al., supra note 11, at 467–68, 489–90.
268. See id. at 497–504.
269. See id. at 511–15.
270. See Sarah J. Bray, Criminal Prosecutions for HIV Exposure: Overview and Analysis
10 (Yale U. Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Research on AIDS, Working Paper, 2003).
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are HIV-positive and thus would not be deterred by the statute. 271 This is especially
concerning given that two-thirds of HIV transmission occurs when the transmitting
partner does not know she is HIV positive. 272
Rather than preventing transmission, HIV-exposure statutes may undermine
public health goals. 273 Even the most carefully drafted HIV-exposure statutes place
costs on knowing one’s serostatus, as knowing one’s status may trigger a
responsibility to reduce risk of transmission to insubstantial levels or ensure that a
partner is aware of the risks. These costs may deter individuals from determining
their status through testing. 274 Criminalization also contributes to the stigma
associated with HIV, particularly when states draft criminal laws that target HIV
exposure as distinct from other harms. 275 Although the framework Part II proposes
reduces this stigma, it cannot eliminate it. Stigma deters testing and treatment, both
of which are essential to the well-being of HIV-positive individuals. 276 Testing and
treatment also reduce transmission, as individuals on ART are less likely to
transmit the disease. 277 HIV-exposure laws may also undermine public health
programs by shattering the fragile trust they build with at-risk communities. 278
Such offenses may encourage individuals to use “serosorting” as a prevention
method—when an individual relies on her ability to determine her partner’s HIVstatus to protect herself from HIV transmission rather than using condoms. 279
Serosorting is a far less effective harm-reduction strategy than consistent condom
use, particularly given the number of HIV-positive individuals who are unaware of
their status. 280 Like the potential benefits of HIV-exposure statutes, however, there
is little empirical evidence of these detriments. 281
HIV-exposure statutes may also encourage the abuse and harassment of
marginalized communities that are disproportionately affected by HIV, such as gay
men or African Americans. 282 Police and prosecutors may threaten investigation

271. Burris et al., supra note 11, at 476–77; Grant, supra note 8, at 399; Lazzarini et al.,
supra note 11, at 239 (stating that as many as one-third of HIV-positive individuals have not
been tested and do not know their status).
272. Burris et al., supra note 11, at 476–77; Grant, supra note 8, at 399.
273. See Lazzarini et al., supra note 11, at 251.
274. See Cameron, supra note 4, at 13–15; Joseph W. Rose, To Tell or Not to Tell:
Legislative Imposition of Partner Notification Duties for HIV Patients, 22 J. LEGAL MED.
107, 108 (2001); Wolf & Vezina, supra note 1, at 869–70.
275. See Cameron, supra note 4, at 13–14; Burris & Cameron, supra note 4, at 580.
276. See Cameron, supra note 4, at 13–15.
277. See supra Part I.B (describing effects of ART on transmission risks).
278. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 1052.
279. See Susan Cassels, Timothy W. Menza, Steven M. Goodreau & Matthew R. Golden,
HIV Serosorting as a Harm Reduction Strategy: Evidence from Seattle, Washington, 23
AIDS 2497, 2497 (2009); Matthew R. Golden, Joanne Stekler, James P. Hughes & Robert
W. Wood, HIV Serosorting in Men Who Have Sex with Men: Is It Safe?, 49 J. ACQUIRED
IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 212, 212 (2008).
280. See Cassels et al., supra note 279; Golden et al., supra note 279, at 216–18.
281. See Burris et al., supra note 11, at 467–68.
282. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 255, at 94; CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HIV AMONG GAY, BISEXUAL AND OTHER MEN WHO HAVE
SEX WITH MEN (MSM) 1 (2010) (describing disproportionate rates of HIV among gay men);
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into individuals’ sex lives under the guise of law enforcement. Prosecutors may
also enforce the law in a discriminatory fashion, targeting gay men and
communities of color, and juries may be more likely to convict members of
unpopular groups. 283 Well-crafted laws can mitigate these problems, but they
cannot eliminate them.
In light of these concerns, the best approach might be to eliminate all
HIV-exposure offenses. Given the low probability of transmission and the small
percentage of transmission that is the result of individuals who are aware of their
status—and thus who potentially have a culpable mental state—culpable conduct is
likely quite rare. The potentially slight benefits of these laws may not outweigh the
serious concerns they raise. 284
To the extent the law is involved in HIV exposure, tort law might provide a
superior means of regulation. Tort law focuses on the duties actors owe each other
and individual harms that result from breaches of duties. This approach might be
better suited than criminal law to delve into the nuances of sexual relationships. In
general, the eradication of “heart-balm” laws has made courts wary of recognizing
a breach of duty in the context of a sexual relationship when the breach does not
result in physical harm. 285 Consequently, most jurisdictions do not recognize a civil

WILSON ET AL., supra note 255, at 17–24; see also Russell K. Robinson, Racing the Closet,
61 STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1463 (2009) (describing negative media portrayal of African
American men in the context of HIV).
283. See Gostin, supra note 1, at 1051–52; Sullivan & Field, supra note 7, at 142, 161–
62, 179, 189–91; Wolf & Vezina, supra note 1, at 871–72.
284. Eliminating HIV-exposure laws has been proposed by scholars who argue that
traditional criminal statutes are better suited to punish culpable HIV exposure. See, e.g.,
Widney Brown, Johanna Hanefeld & James Welsh, Criminalising HIV Transmission:
Punishment Without Protection, 17 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 119, 119 (2009) (arguing for
the use of assault rather than HIV-exposure statutes when an individual intends to transmit
the infection); McArthur, supra note 101, at 740. Several states use traditional criminal
statutes such as assault or reckless endangerment to prosecute HIV exposure or transmission.
See, e.g., Hancock v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998). This
approach has its own weaknesses—most notably that these offenses may also punish conduct
that is insufficiently risky and do not adequately account for the importance of consent.
Assuming HIV infection qualifies as “bodily injury,” the assault offense would encompass
the actions of an individual who exposes another to a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
HIV infection with intent to transmit the disease. Using assault in this manner may be
problematic, however, because such statutes may fail to mitigate liability appropriately when
the victim consents to a risk of bodily injury. See supra note 254. Endangerment offenses
also fail to provide adequate guidance on the role of consent. See supra Part II.C.
Endangerment statutes are often poorly drafted as well, with text that leaves vague what
degree of risk it requires. The Model Penal Code prohibition on conduct that “may place”
another in danger is particularly confusing because it creates the possibility that it is illegal
to create even a risk of a risk. See Cahill, supra note 30, at 925–26. The Model Penal Code
does not require actual endangerment but rather conduct that may place another in danger.
Id.
285. See John Diamond, Rethinking Compensation for Mental Distress: A Critique of the
Restatement (Third) §§ 45–47, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 141, 163–64 (2008); Deana A.
Pollard, Sex Torts, 91 MINN. L. REV. 769, 787–802 (2007) (describing liability for
transmission of sexually transmitted disease); Fan, supra note 11, at 41–42.
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claim for sexual HIV exposure without transmission. 286 A few states, however,
have allowed plaintiffs to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
where they were exposed to HIV in the absence of transmission. 287 Courts have
limited these claims to circumstances in which a defendant's breach of a duty owed
to the plaintiff has resulted in the plaintiff being exposed to “a scientifically
accepted method of transmission of the virus.” 288 Tort law allows the court to
weigh factors such as the context of the sexual relationship, the likelihood of
transmission, the defendant’s understanding of the risk of transmission (e.g.,
whether the defendant knew she tested positive for HIV or was symptomatic), and
the burden disclosure posed to the defendant in determining whether the defendant
breached a duty to her sexual partner. 289
B. Criminalization amid Evolving Knowledge
The arguments set forth in this Article also have implications for broader
debates about what and how the law should criminalize. HIV-exposure laws
demonstrate a paradox that plagues the rules/standards debate. When a new type of
harm surfaces, lawmakers may lack access to the information necessary to create
good law. Little may be known about the harm and how to best curtail it. Rules can
provide clarity and consistency while our understanding of the threat develops. Yet
rules, more than standards, are prone to anachronism when information changes.
The best short-term response to a novel threat may become the worst long-term
response.
HIV-exposure laws exemplify legislation passed in response to a new but poorly
understood threat. Most HIV-exposure laws were passed either in an environment
of fear and uncertainty in the 1980s or in the early-to-mid 1990s in response to
recommendations from the Reagan administration that were codified in the Ryan
White Care Act. 290 At that time, far less was known about HIV transmission and

286. See Diamond, supra note 285, at 163–64; Fan, supra note 11, at 41–43; Pollard,
supra note 285, at 783–802 (describing liability for transmission of sexually transmitted
disease).
287. See, e.g., Roes v. FHP, Inc., 985 P.2d 661 (Haw. 1999); Majca v. Beekil, 701
N.E.2d 1084 (Ill. 1998); Ornstein v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 881 N.E.2d
1187, 1189–90 (N.Y. 2008); McLarney v. Cmty. Health Plan, 680 N.Y.S.2d 281 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998); Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585, 590 (Tenn.
1993). It is important to note, however, that these claims do not recognize the risk of
infection itself as a harm, but rather the plaintiff's emotional distress caused by the
possibility of infection.
288. Ornstein, 881 N.E.2d at 1190 (citation omitted). These cases have often arisen in
circumstances in which a hospital’s negligence has resulted in a hospital worker being
exposed to a needle stick where the needle contained the blood of an HIV-positive
individual. See, e.g., id.; McLarney, 680 N.Y.S.2d 281. But courts have, on occasion,
allowed such claims for sexual exposure. See, e.g., O’Neill v. O’Neill, 694 N.Y.S.2d 772
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
289. See, e.g., Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1392–93 (W.D. Mich. 1993)
(discussing analysis in the context of HIV-transmission claim).
290. Pub. L. No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576 (2006). In order to be eligible for funding under
the Ryan White Care Act, states were required to demonstrate that their criminal law could
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prevention. 291 ART was not readily available, and the therapy available was less
effective at decreasing transmission rates. 292 Certain sexual activities might have
seemed adequate proxies for substantial and unjustifiable risk in this environment.
But if lack of information justified these proxies, advancements over the past
decades have rendered them archaic. And new proxies that align with existing
medical knowledge will likely become outdated as we discover more effective
methods of HIV prevention and treatment.
Laws drafted in response to new threats reflect and magnify a broader dilemma
in lawmaking: in any circumstance, even a well-reasoned decision of whether to
use a rule and which rule to use, can become outdated. Legislatures are bound by
the information—or lack thereof—available to them when the legislation is
drafted. 293 An ideal legislature rationally considers the most recent and accurate
information to determine the extent to which a proxy measures its underlying
target, whether a rule is likely to have a deterrent effect, and if the value of this
deterrence outweighs the burdens created by the proxy’s overinclusiveness.
Knowledge of the proxy’s accuracy, deterrent value, and the burden it imposes on
individuals can change drastically over time. Even if all factors seem to weigh
clearly in favor of proxy use when legislation is drafted, the information used in
this analysis may quickly become anachronistic. 294
While all legislation can become outdated with changes in knowledge, attitudes,
and scientific advancements, proxy-based rules are particularly prone to these
problems. A statute that directly addresses the target of the proxy can more easily
adapt to changing circumstances. For example, the framework suggested in Part II,
which requires evidence of substantial and unjustifiable risk of transmission,
incorporates changes in understanding of transmission rates, creation of newer,
more effective prevention methods, and even changes in the severity of the harm of
HIV transmission as treatment becomes more effective. In contrast, the proxy of
“sexual penetration” is stagnant and cannot incorporate new knowledge.
prosecute HIV transmission and exposure. See Wolf & Vezina, supra note 1, at 844. This
was a recommendation from the Reagan administration's AIDS Commission Report. CTR.
FOR HIV L. AND POL’Y, AIDS STIGMA AND THE CREATION OF A VIRAL UNDERCLASS 2 (2011).
Only three states have enacted statutes since 2000 (Virginia, South Dakota, and Mississippi),
and at least twelve states passed statutes prior to breakthroughs in ART in 1996 (Arkansas,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, and Tennessee). For statutes, see supra note 2.
291. Michael H. Merson, Jeffrey O’Malley, David Serwadda & Chantawipa Apisuk, The
History and Challenge of HIV Prevention, 372 LANCET 475 (2008).
292. See Zita Lazzarini & Robert Klitzman, HIV and the Law: Integrating Law, Policy,
and Social Epidemiology, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 533, 534 (2002) (describing the
introduction of ART and its effects on improving HIV-infection prognosis and decreasing
transmission rates); Timothy Mastro, The Global Fight Against AIDS and HIV: Current
State of the Global Epidemic, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 413, 418–19 (2003) (describing
significant improvements in ART since the introduction of AZT in the 1980s); Lisa Terrizzi,
The Need for Improved Access to Experimental Drug Therapy: AIDS Activists and Their
Call for a Parallel Track Policy, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 589 (1991) (describing the introduction of
AZT in the 1980s and the limited access to treatment in the 1980s and early 1990s).
293. See Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 266–67
(2007); Sunstein, supra note 211, at 993–94.
294. See Gersen, supra note 293, at 266–68; Sunstein, supra note 211, at 993–94.
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The problem of anachronistic proxies is exacerbated by the impracticability of
legislative reform. Ideally, legislatures could amend outdated legislation in
response to new information about HIV transmission by changing or eliminating
the proxies. But even bad law is difficult to change. 295 This is in part because
retracting criminal law is more administratively burdensome and less politically
popular than maintaining the status quo. 296 For example, calls to reform Iowa’s
HIV-exposure statute after the Rhoades case were met with some skepticism by a
member of the legislative committee charged with reorganizing the criminal code,
who cautioned that the last major review of Iowa’s criminal code occurred in 1978
and began in the 1960s. 297
The proliferation of proxy-based rules in criminal law therefore raises several
concerns that merit additional attention. One such concern is whether there are
practical methods to minimalize, ex ante, the likelihood that the proxy will become
anachronistic where current knowledge weighs in favor of proxy use. 298 For
example, can legislators include provisions requiring periodic reconsideration of a
proxy’s fit, deterrent value, and costs?
Temporary legislation provides a possible solution. 299 Richard E. Myers II has
suggested a constitutional amendment requiring all criminal laws to have sunset
provisions. 300 Myers suggests that sunset provisions can narrow the gap between
public sentiment and criminal offenses, noting that criminal laws are often
hopelessly out of touch with community values. 301 HIV-exposure laws demonstrate
a separate problem that is equally if not more troubling: where criminal laws reflect
public sentiment but not scientific evidence. 302 This is particularly likely to arise
where the offense affects marginalized groups or unpopular activities, which

295. Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law
Through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1327, 1337–38 (2008); William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 527–28 (2001).
296. Myers, supra note 295, at 1337–38.
297. See Lynda Waddington, Considering Changes to Iowa’s HIV Transmission Law
May Make Sense, But Hesitation Persists, IOWA INDEP., July 3, 2009.
298. There are many ex post methods of changing (or failing to apply) a rule that makes
no sense in context or has grown anachronistic. These methods, rather than changing the
creation of a rule, alter how universally the rule is followed or applied. As such, they may
have many problems; for example, they may undermine the rule of law, place enormous
discretion at the hands of rule-followers or rule-enforcers (who may have their own biases or
lack information that would enable them to determine when following the rule is warranted),
or fail to correct the potential chilling effect a rule may have on behavior that should not be
prohibited but nonetheless falls within the rule. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 212,
at 61–73; SCHAUER, supra note 211, at 202–05; Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 228,
1203–05, 1212–13; Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz’s Morality of
Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 1010 (1989); Schauer, supra note 223, at 804–05;
Sunstein, supra note 211, at 1006–1010.
299. For a thorough discussion of temporary legislation, see Gersen, supra note 293.
300. See Myers, supra note 295.
301. See id. at 1335.
302. See Gersen, supra note 293, at 266–78 (discussing benefits of temporary legislation
where available information may change).
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strengthens its political inertia. 303 Sunset provisions might therefore be especially
useful where the harm is medical or technological in nature and involves a
stigmatized group or activity. Drug use and possession offenses, as well as
prostitution, provide examples of such offenses. A sunset provision on drug
possession statutes would require periodic re-evaluation of its justifications as new
evidence emerges, and allowing an offense to merely lapse could provide
lawmakers with a more politically tenable alternative to active decriminalization. 304
Sunset provisions, however, have significant administrative costs and other
detriments. 305 Even if they are instituted, they may fail to solve the problem of
politically popular but scientifically outdated offenses. 306
To the extent that anachronism cannot be prevented, HIV-exposure laws
demonstrate the need to consider how possible anachronism should be considered
in determining whether a proxy use is appropriate when drafting a given criminal
offense. At minimum, such costs and the difficulty of determining them only
underscore the need for legislatures and scholars to employ an exacting analysis
prior to drafting a proxy-based rule, and to re-evaluate their use periodically as
circumstances change.
HIV-exposure statutes also provide an object lesson in the overcriminalization
debate. Numerous criminal law scholars have argued that there has been an
unwarranted expansion in the depth and breadth of criminal law, even as they
disagree about the scope of this problem and how to address it. 307 This Article’s
analysis of HIV-exposure offenses contributes to that debate by illustrating that
critical analysis of how to criminalize an act can reshape the debate of whether to
criminalize it. Proxy-based rules tend to focus the criminalization debate on which
proxies to employ. 308 This obscures the question of whether the behavior that is the
real target of the proxies is worth the costs of criminalization. In the context of HIV
exposure, refocusing the statutes on unassumed, substantial, and unjustifiable risk
strengthens arguments that the costs of these statutes outweigh their benefits.
This refocusing can transform other criminalization debates. Prostitution
provides a notable example. Outside the context of human trafficking, prostitution
is arguably an implicit endangerment offense. Exchanging sex for money may not
be harmful in an isolated circumstance, but it risks other harms. 309 It risks

303. A related problem is the tendency of both ordinary and expert citizens to
overestimate and overreact to newly recognized risks. See id. at 263, 268–71.
304. See Myers, supra note 295, at 1365.
305. See id. at 1369–80 (discussing detriments of sunset provisions); Gersen, supra note
293, at 263–66.
306. For example, sunset provisions might encourage lawmakers to pass duplicative
offenses as a means of entrenching legislation that will expire when the lawmakers who
support it are no longer in power.
307. See HUSAK, supra note 17. See generally Symposium, Overcriminalization: The
Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541 (2005).
308. Cf. ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 212, at 1218–19 (arguing that rules that
purport to be something they are not distort the debate of what the rules are about and the
ends to which they are directed).
309. Human trafficking constitutes a harm in itself, at the very least because it involves
forms of kidnapping and rape.
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physically and psychologically harming the prostitute and contributing to the moral
decay of society and the patriarchal structural inequality of women. 310 The
exchange of sex for money serves as a proxy for these risks. If this proxy were
critically examined, as suggested in Part III.A, and the proxy’s fit, deterrent value,
and costs were weighed, it might reasonably be determined that prostitution is a
poor proxy for these risks. Yet, if these harms are targeted directly, they might not
warrant criminalization. For example, a criminal prohibition on sexual conduct that
poses a substantial and unjustifiable risk of contributing to the moral decay of
society might seem outdated in a post-Lawrence v. Texas world. 311 Similarly,
criminalizing sex that poses a substantial and unjustifiable risk of psychologically
harming one partner arguably would not justify punishing the partner whose
welfare was risked. 312 Other crimes, such as possession offenses, merit the same
analysis.
CONCLUSION
Our understanding of HIV has changed and continues to change. Yet our
method of criminalizing HIV exposure remains rooted in an approach that,
however well intentioned, has far outgrown its usefulness. Focusing on proxies of
serostatus and sexual activities is incompatible with the nuances of HIV exposure
and transmission and sexual relationships. This Article proposes a framework that
is more in line with these nuances and, just as important, that can adapt as they
change. While the proposed framework comes at the expense of higher
administrative costs, these costs are outweighed by the prospect of better law in
theory and in practice.
This framework is no panacea to the problems of HIV criminalization, and
should be the beginning of a larger debate rather than the end of one. While this
Article is primarily concerned with what it terms the first branch of the HIV
criminalization debate, its argument transforms the second branch. By limiting
criminalization to rare conduct, it strengthens arguments that the costs of these
offenses outweigh their benefits. Careful consideration of the costs of HIV
criminalization may support the argument that the best approach is no offense at
all.
HIV criminalization is an important chapter in the ongoing debate about how
legislatures should employ the criminal law in the context of new threats. Where
uncertainty abounds, rules provide clarity but leave little room for growth. This is a
profound problem where our understanding of the underlying harm is likely to
change with new information. The political impracticability of changing
legislation—particularly criminal law—requires legislators and scholars alike to
carefully consider the costs of anachronism when drafting legislation. HIV is not
the first serious transmittable disease and it is unlikely it will be the last. Outside

310. See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 228, at 1217; Michelle Madden Dempsey, Sex
Trafficking and Criminalization: In Defense of Feminist Abolitionism, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1729, 1738–39, 1744–45 (2010).
311. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a statute
criminalizing sodomy).
312. See Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 228, 1217–18.
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the context of disease transmission, statutes that incorporate changing technologies
and scientific innovations—or even statutes whose primary justification is a
deterrent effect that can be scientifically disproven—must contend with the
problem of proxy anachronism. Going forward, we should carefully heed the
lessons of HIV-exposure offenses.

